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ABSTRACT 
China’s economic rise is coupled with a growing need to find reliable foreign 
energy sources.  China is the world’s second largest oil consumer.  China’s demand for 
oil is outpacing previous estimates and accounted for 38 percent of the world’s increased 
demand in 2006.  Venezuela is the sixth largest oil producer and is now providing oil to 
China as a way to diversify exports away from the United States.  As China’s demand 
increases and global oil production wanes, China will become major a challenge for the 
United States.  China will need strategic allies to be able to compete and will find a 
willing partner in Venezuela. 
The solution requires a new approach to international oil markets that removes 
politics from the sale of oil.  A multilateral effort led by Japan has the greatest likelihood 
of success in a world that is becoming increasingly competitive over resources. Creating 
a framework that promotes cooperation before supply becomes limited is very important 
for success.  If the three largest importers, United States, Japan and China, all work 
together, the likelihood of future war or severe economic shock over oil among the great 
powers will be diminished. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. PURPOSE.........................................................................................................1 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................4 
1. Balancing vs. Bandwagoning ..............................................................4 
2. Economic Engagement / Investment Politics.....................................4 
3. China’s Ambition.................................................................................5 
4. Soft Power.............................................................................................6 
C. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTERS ..................7 
II. ECONOMICS, HISTORY AND CURRENT CONDITIONS.................................9 
A. CHINA ..............................................................................................................9 
1. PRC .......................................................................................................9 
2. China Goes Global .............................................................................11 
a. Chinese FDI ............................................................................11 
b. Arms Exports...........................................................................14 
c. Soft Power ...............................................................................16 
3. China’s Growing Demand for Energy .............................................17 
a. Oil ............................................................................................17 
b. Growing Demand ....................................................................18 
c. Current Imports.......................................................................21 
d. Other Raw Material Needs .....................................................21 
e. Security Implications for China .............................................22 
4. Beijing’s Approach toward Venezuela.............................................24 
B. VENEZUELA.................................................................................................25 
1. Monroe Doctrine ................................................................................26 
2. Oil ........................................................................................................27 
3. Politics .................................................................................................29 
4. Hugo Chavez.......................................................................................30 
a. Socialism..................................................................................30 
b. Dictator or Liberator?.............................................................31 
c. Stated Goals.............................................................................33 
5. United States/Venezuela Relations ...................................................34 
a. U.S. Energy Imports From Venezuela ...................................34 
b. Current Political Differences..................................................36 
C. JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES ........................................................37 
III. CHINA’S PEACEFUL RISE?..................................................................................41 
A. NEW ORDER.................................................................................................41 
1. Economic Power.................................................................................41 
2. Soft Power...........................................................................................42 
3. Investment in Latin America and Venezuela ..................................44 
B. NATIONALISM AND THE PROMISE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH ...46 
1. What is Chinese Nationalism? ..........................................................46 
 viii
2. The Promise of Economic Growth ...................................................48 
3. China Against the World...................................................................49 
4. How Does Nationalism Affect Policy?..............................................50 
C. REGIONAL HEGEMON:  HOW LARGE IS THE REGION? ...............51 
D. MILITARY MODERNIZATION ................................................................52 
IV. INDICATIONS OF THREAT TO UNITED STATES ..........................................57 
A. POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITY .....................................................57 
1. Demonstration of Power Projection Beyond China........................57 
2. Military Exercises With Venezuela ..................................................58 
B. WORLD OIL PRODUCTION CRISIS.......................................................59 
C. VENEZUELAN POLITICS..........................................................................60 
D. CHINESE OIL IMPORT CAPABILITY....................................................61 
1. Construction of Heavy Crude Refinery Capacity...........................62 
2. Construction of Tankers That Can Traverse the Pacific ...............63 
3. East-West Oil Pipeline.......................................................................63 
E. OTHER REGIONS........................................................................................64 
V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................65 
A. CHINA’S AMBITION...................................................................................65 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES........................................66 
1. Engage Latin America?.....................................................................66 
2. Need to Reduce U.S. Oil Dependency...............................................66 
3. New Containment Policy? .................................................................67 
4. Monitor Indicators.............................................................................68 
C. A MULTILATERAL OPTION....................................................................69 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................73 











LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. China’s Oil Production and Consumption, 1986-2006....................................20 
Figure 2. U.S. Oil Imports, 1975-2006. ..........................................................................35 



























I want to thank my thesis advisors, Dr. Alice Miller and CAPT Timothy Doorey, 
who were a source of outstanding assistance and guidance in completing my thesis.  Dr. 
Miller’s many classes helped build my understanding of China and her feedback on my 
work was brilliant.  CAPT Doorey was instrumental in finding my research topic and 
keeping it focused on issues that are important today.  I would also like to thank BG 
Charles Hooper, whose guidance, mentoring, and instruction came during the important 
formative times of my thesis. 
I want to also thank my wife, Cimbria.  She provided encouragement and 
motivation to finish my thesis at times when the end seemed forever away.  Her patience 
and understanding during the many long days of research and writing were a gift that I 
will always remember.  Finally, I want to thank my brother, Dennis, for always taking 
time to help, even on short notice.  His assistance in editing and as a sounding board for 
ideas was a tremendous help in developing and completing my thesis. 
 xii





Since the Chinese Communist Party took control of China in 1949 by means of 
armed revolution, it has sought international legitimacy.  Some big events that validated 
the People’s Republic of China include the United Nations admitting the PRC in 1971, 
the United States finally giving diplomatic recognition to the PRC in 1979 and most 
recently, the World Trade Organization allowing China to join in 2001.  All of these 
major steps in Chinese foreign affairs have overshadowed the progress the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) has made in many Third World countries over decades. 
Chinese involvement in Latin America began with CCP support (mostly 
rhetorical) for the various communist movements on the continent.  Today, China gives 
no apparent support, rhetorical or material, to these groups.  Instead, China is investing 
billions of dollars in Latin America and building strong ties with any government that 
will have them, regardless of ideology.  The role of communist ideology in Chinese 
politics and foreign policy has been replaced with all of its emphasis on nationalism and 
economic self-interest.1 
This thesis assesses the political and strategic implications for the United States of 
Chinese investment in Venezuela.  The broader background for this thesis rests on 
assessment of: China’s strategic goals, the Monroe Doctrine, American and Chinese 
energy concerns and the resources in Venezuela, the history of Venezuelan exports, and 
the foreign policy views of the Venezuelan leadership. The thesis focuses on a detailed 
history and on projections of Chinese investment into Venezuela, and will evaluate the 
short and long term implications for American strategic interests in South America. 
 
                                                 
1 Nicholas R. Lardy, Integrating China in the Global Economy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2002), 11. 
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This thesis seeks to answer three questions.  First, is China’s investment in 
Venezuela purely for long-term economic gain?  Second, is Beijing pursuing strategic 
and political goals as well?  Third, what are the long-term implications for the United 
States, and how may U.S. policymakers respond?  While it is impossible to predict the 
future, it is reasonable to identify key indicators of future trends and outcomes and 
whether the Chinese-Venezuelan economic relationship has strategic implication for the 
United States in the future. 
China has steadily increased its direct foreign investment (FDI) around the world 
since 1993.  After a small start, China's investments have grown to multi-billion dollar 
levels in oil production and other infrastructure projects around the world.  This has been 
especially true in areas such as Africa and South America that, in recent years, have 
enjoyed less than full financial and political attention of the United States.  In terms of 
strategic implications for the United States, Venezuela is not China's largest FDI 
recipient, but it could be the most important, due to the volatile nature of the Venezuelan 
leadership and its anti-American rhetoric.2  From an economic standpoint it is important 
to examine this relationship because Venezuela is estimated to have the largest oil 
reserves in South America and is a significant source of oil for the United States.3  In 
addition, the government of Venezuela has taken a highly antagonistic stance towards the 
United States and is currently implementing nationalization of its foreign-owned oil 
fields.4  China has invested over 1.6 billion USD in Venezuelan infrastructure projects 
                                                 
2 The majority of FDI from China goes to its nearby neighbors in Asia. Chinese investment in Sudan is 
covered extensively by the media due to political issues; however Sudan receives far less Chinese FDI than 
Venezuela receives. 
3 Estimates for Venezuelan oil exports to the Unites States are more than 1.1 million barrels a day. 
Energy Information Administration, January 2007 Petroleum Supply Monthly With Data for November 
2006, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/petroleum_supply_monthly/current/pdf/ta
ble52.pdf (accessed February 4, 2007). 
4 Andy Webb-Vidal, “Venezuela Takes Control of Private Oilfields,” Financial Times, January 3, 
2006. 
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and has made deals for future oil procurement.5 Some questions that arise from these 
facts include:  Why is Venezuela leaning strongly toward a weaker power, China, rather 
than its traditional ally, the United States?  Why is China spending billions on 
infrastructure projects in Venezuela as well as in the rest of Latin America?  What does 
this all mean for the United States?  If Chinese encroachment in South America is likely 
to disrupt the supply of oil to the United States, that prospect should be identified early so 
that policy can be adjusted in advance to address this. 
The goal of this thesis to convince the reader that China’s rise is a geo-strategic 
threat to the United States.  The suggested threat is not due to any CCP grand strategy of 
conquest or any other unstated goal, rather it is the almost unavoidable consequence of 
limited resources in an increasingly competitive environment.  Investments and oil deals 
in Venezuela are an example of how China’s energy-based foreign policy is being carried 
out around the world and exemplary of the increasing challenge this represents to the 
United States.  The growing relationship between China and Venezuela is an especially 
important case because Venezuela is a significant source of oil for the United States.  The 
impact of China’s attempts to “lock-up” resources is likely to be felt by the United States 
first with the loss of imports from Venezuela. 
To mitigate the risk of conflict with China over oil, the issue needs to be 
addressed before a major oil shortage occurs on a global scale.  Effectively developing a 
multilateral forum to address this problem will require a cooperative effort among the 
many oil importers and exporters.  This thesis will introduce Japan as a key ally in 
developing a world solution to China’s rising need for oil and at the same time toning 
down the rhetoric from oil exporters like Venezuela. 
                                                 
5 Phillip C. Saunders, China’s Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools. Washington, D.C.: 
National Defense University Press, 2006, 45. Recent events include a statement by the Venezuelan Foreign 
Minister in 2006 that China has agreed to fund 4 billion USD toward a joint investment fund of 6 billion 
USD. This money will primarily be used for infrastructure projects in Venezuela. “Venezuela, China set up 
investment fund of 6 billion USD,” Vietnam News Agency, Wednesday, October 25, 2006. 
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B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Much has been written about Chinese investment in Southeast Asia and Africa, 
but little academic attention has been devoted to China’s economic relations with Latin 
America.  Due to the economic importance of Venezuelan oil to the United States, it is 
important to assess Chinese influence in Venezuela.  Investigating the political and 
strategic implications for the United States of Sino-Venezuelan relations invites the 
application of a variety of theoretical and other perspectives. 
1. Balancing vs. Bandwagoning 
To understand the shifting of Venezuelan loyalties toward China, the theory of 
balancing is useful.  In Theory of International Politics, Kenneth Waltz examines the 
tendency for weaker nations to form allegiances to other weak nations as a means of 
offsetting the strength of a stronger power.  This allows for a more balanced international 
system and lessens the likelihood of a single hegemonic power in the region.6 From this 
perspective, it makes sense to balance against the hegemonic U.S. position, therefore 
siding with China would be a logical choice.  This theory may explain in part why 
Venezuelan leadership is developing relations with Beijing and pulling away from the 
United States.  From another perspective, however, it would seem prudent for Venezuela 
to side with the United States as the stronger power.  The strength of the United States 
and its proximity to Venezuela compared to China’s weakness and distance from 
Venezuela might lead Caracas instead to lean toward Washington. This is described by 
Waltz as “bandwagoning.”7 
2. Economic Engagement / Investment Politics 
Today, China is facing a potential energy crisis in fueling its rapidly growing 
economy.  This requirement for oil imports is motivating investment in many countries 
having oil that can be extracted for use in China.  In addition, China is searching for 
                                                 
6 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics. Berkeley, CA: McGraw-Hill, 1979, 126. 
7 Ibid., 126, Waltz credits the term “bandwagoning” to Stephen Van Evera. 
 5
alternative energy sources (other than oil) to diversify and better meet its increasing 
energy need.  Barry Naughton’s analysis of China’s economy underscores the need for 
continued expansion to maintain China’s overall economic health and to find new sources 
[of energy] to supplement China’s own insufficient domestic oil production.8  To that 
end, China has built new schools, roads, and stadiums in many developing countries, 
along with its focus on energy developments in oil, natural gas and minerals.9  The net 
gain in political capital that these projects have had for China is difficult to quantify; 
however it is not surprising that Venezuela has recently encouraged Iran to shift oil 
exports from the United States to China.10 
3. China’s Ambition 
Chinese officials have repeatedly stated that China is striving for a “peaceful 
rise.”11  This complements the long-standing basis of Chinese foreign policy, “the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.”12  Looked at through the lens of idealism, it would 
seem that Chinese foreign policy rhetoric is consistent with a modern evolution of 
international relations.  John Mueller, a strong proponent of idealism, suggests that the 
need for major conflict between powerful states has become a relic of history.13  If the 
idealist camp is correct, then China’s rise will remain peaceful because strong powers are 
                                                 
8 Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2007), 333-343. 
9 Saunders, China’s Global Activism, 35-53. 
10 Andy Webb-Vidal, “Venezuela enlists Iran to steer oil to China,” Financial Times, London, 
England, January 31, 2005, Edition 2. Venezuela’s encouragement to steer oil away from U.S. markets is 
mostly rhetorical given the ongoing 1995 U.S. embargo on Iranian imports. Nevertheless, it may indicate 
that Venezuela is pushing a greater divide between the United States and Iran. 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu /cabs/Iran/Background.html (accessed March 30, 2007). Iranian oil reserves 
are estimated to be ten percent of world totals. Presently, the top two importers of Iranian crude oil are 
Japan and China respectively. http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iran/Oil.html (accessed March 30, 2007). 
11 “China’s peaceful rise” was first announced as a goal by Chinese leaders in 2003 and has been an 
ongoing topic of debate. Zheng Bijian, “China's ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status,” Foreign Affairs 
84, (September/October 2005). 
12 Pan Tao, “Timeless Theme of International Relations,” Beijing Review 47, no. 23 (2004): 18. Zhou 
Enlai first stated the “Five Principles” in December 1953 during negotiations with India. These principles 
have been heralded by Chinese diplomacy ever since. 
13 John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War, New York: Basic Books, 
1989. 
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unlikely to tolerate war with other strong powers.14  Therefore, as China becomes more 
developed, conflict becomes less likely.  While this has given hope to some idealists, it 
does not necessarily fit with other theories regarding emerging world powers.  As evident 
in his theory of offensive realism, John Mearsheimer is a leading exponent of the 
perspective that a rising China poses a danger.  He contends that a rising power is always 
interested in becoming at least a regional hegemon to ensure its own security.  When the 
interests of this rising regional hegemon conflict with [or threaten] the interests of the 
prevailing hegemon, it is sure to lead to some level of conflict.15 This idea is contrary to 
the frequent view that China is a “status quo power.”16  There is little reason for a rising 
nation to desire to play by the rules of the current status quo powers. 
4. Soft Power 
The rise of China raises questions beyond traditional international relations 
theory.17  Joseph Nye’s term “soft power” originally pertained to non-military, non-
economic, traditional means of international influence.18  Although others have analyzed 
China’s growing soft power using broader definitions, it is equally important to 
understand Chinese influence in Nye’s original description.19 
China’s massive economic growth in the past decades has amazed most observers.  
In spite of the West’s hopes, the shift from communism to capitalism (and the ensuing 
economic boom) did not cause a similar transformation in politics.  The CCP remains a 
powerful authoritarian government with no plans to give up its hold on power.  This 
                                                 
14 Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War, 221. 
15 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001) and John J. 
Mearsheimer, “The Rise of China will not be Peaceful at All,” The Australian, November 18, 2005. 
16 A “status quo power” is one that wants to maintain the current world system even though that 
power is considered second rate. Therefore, there is a motivation to maintain another nation’s supremacy 
for its own security interests. For more on “status quo powers” see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among 
Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 5th ed., 1978), 46. 
17 Traditional IR theory is referring to the concepts of realism, idealism and balance of power. 
18 Joseph S. Nye, Soft power: the means to success in world politics. (New York: Public Affairs, 
2004). 
19 Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power.” Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, Policy Brief 47, (June 2006), 1. 
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model of economic success without political reform may be an attractive concept for 
governments with less mature democratic establishments.20  China has become a 
vanguard of authoritarian capitalism.21  At the same time, the soft power wielded by the 
United States (and therefore the Liberal Democracy model) has waned recently.  China’s 
success has not gone unnoticed by developing countries like Venezuela and therefore 
China’s “soft power” capital is on the rise. 
C. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTERS 
This thesis will assess the degree to which these theories adequately explain the 
evolving relationship between China and Venezuela in order to determine what are the 
political underpinnings of Chinese investment and the ramifications for the United States.  
The case study of Venezuela may buttress the argument that Chinese expansion beyond 
regional Asia-Pacific hegemony underscores its expanding global influence and 
ambitions.  It is already accepted by most that China has significant influence in 
Southeast Asia.  It is therefore worthwhile to look at China’s influence in South America 
and in Venezuela in particular.  This case may suggest future patterns in other developing 
countries in the region and the world.  Most important to the United States is that 
Venezuela is a vital source of oil imports and Chinese involvement is potentially contrary 
to Washington’s interests. Analysis of the case of Venezuela will involve statistical 
trends of Chinese investments and other trends in the region and beyond.  Furthermore, a 
broader assessment of China and Venezuela’s foreign policy goals, derived from primary 
and secondary sources, will create a foundation on which future scenarios and further 
research can be based. 
An analysis of the relationship between China, Venezuela, and demand for oil 
will be presented  in  five chapters.   Chapter I  will present the analytical framework and 
general scope of the thesis.   Chapter II  presents the economic and political background 
for China and Venezuela with linkages to the United States when necessary.  Chapter 
III describes  China’s rise in  depth and begins to build the case for potential conflict 
                                                 
20 Azar Gat, “The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers,” Foreign Affairs 87 (2007), 67. 
21 Ibid., 66. 
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with the United States.  Covered topics include China’s rising nationalism, military 
investment and modernization, and the implications of regional ambition in a globalized 
world.  These topics are discussed to illustrate the growing danger that China could 
present the United States and helps illustrate the need for a new approach in dealing with 
resource shortages.   In Chapter IV there will be a discussion of potential threat 
indicators.  This is critical to this study in two ways.  First, some analysts point to the 
non-threatening nature of China’s investment in Venezuela based on the lack of certain 
factors; however, new evidence is dismantling these arguments. Second, it is crucial for 
policy-makers to be aware of further indications that the relationship poses risk to U.S. 
national security.  Finally, in the conclusion there will be a discussion of some options 
with a final policy recommendation involving a multilateral approach with Japan.  The 
involvement of Japan is based on two factors.  First, Japan is the second largest oil 
importer and therefore has a major interest in the outcome of a new global oil framework.  
Second, Japan is widely considered to be a leader in multilateral non-military diplomacy 
(in recent decades) and would be more likely to sway the world’s opinion favorably 
toward a multilateral approach than would the United States.  The probability that China 
will conform to a new international framework would be significantly improved when a 
majority of world powers are in agreement. 
 9
II. ECONOMICS, HISTORY AND CURRENT CONDITIONS 
A. CHINA 
China’s rise over the past three decades has been a miraculous recovery from 
many years of backwardness and poverty. Sometimes referred to as the “Century of 
Humiliation,” the roughly 100 years prior to the communist revolution gives the Chinese 
people a sense of accomplishment today.  Growth in China’s domestic economy and 
status has caused China to be regarded a rising power in the world, as both a great 
example of recovery and a potential threat to the United States. 
1. PRC 
Before 1980, Most Chinese experienced a low standard of living.  As in all things, 
there are a multitude of factors that contributed to their poverty.  A re-occurring theme in 
China’s history is that prior to the 1980’s, government failure was a fundamental cause 
for the poverty and backwardness experienced by most of the population.  Mao’s three-
decade experiment with Stalinist economics led to an economic disaster.  The agricultural 
sector bore the brunt of weak government and bad economic decisions and is still among 
the more backward sectors in China today. 
After Deng Xiaoping’s legendary statement, “To get rich is glorious,” China 
embarked on a new path toward economic development.22  From the foundation of a 
command economy under a communist government, in 1978 China embraced a 
deliberate, measured period of reform that led to enormous economic growth.  Today, 
China is among the largest economies in the world and accounts for a substantial 
percentage of world trade.  This huge transformation in a relatively short period of time 
has left other developing countries looking for ways to emulate China’s growth.  
                                                 
22 Although this is often cited as an undisputed quotation of Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s, there is 
some doubt as to its validity. Some argue that this quote is entirely a western fabrication to explain China’s 
changing policies. Evelyn Iritani, “Great Idea but Don’t Quote Him; Deng Xiaoping’s famous one-liner 
started China on the way to Capitalism.” Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles, CA: September 9, 2004, A1. 
http://lezhou.net/0912/dxp.htm (accessed March 19, 2007). Whether or not this was a true Deng Xiaoping 
quote, it typifies the exuberant transformation in the Chinese economy and the boom of private enterprises. 
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Developing countries with oppressive regimes are especially interested in China’s 
success as a model for economic development under authoritarianism.23  It is not 
surprising that developing countries like Venezuela are attracted to China when its 
leaders observe China’s staggering growth compared to other economies in the world. 
Beginning in 1978, China implemented major economic reforms.  China 
transitioned from a command economy with a major emphasis on large industrial 
production to a market economy that offered private enterprises the ability to grow in a 
competitive market.24  The average peasant became able to build personal savings and 
then invest it into local economic ventures.25  Ultimately, the reforms resulted in a huge 
increase in agricultural output that was three to four times higher in 2005 than it was in 
1978.26  As the savings grew the primary investment option was the Township-Village 
enterprises (TVEs), which later became the privatized corporations of today’s China.  
More investment created capital to produce more goods and, in turn, increased personal 
savings.  This ongoing cycle created a major shift in the Chinese economy. 
The influx of foreign investment boomed in 1992 when domestic markets were 
opened to FDI.  This investment came mostly from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau 
because there were fewer language and cultural barriers.27  It was advantageous that the 
reforms occurred incrementally over time.  It is unlikely that any level of stability within 
the Party would have been maintained if all changes had happened at once.  Since 
China’s opening in 1992, the enormous population in China has been a great attraction 
for foreign firms.  With a population of 1.2 billion, China is generally viewed as having 
an enormous market potential.  The amount of FDI has grown steadily and today  
 
 
                                                 
23 Saunders, China’s Global Activism, 17. 
24 Naughton, The Chinese Economy, 92. 
25 Justin Yifu Lin, “The Household Responsibility System Reform in China: A Peasant’s Institutional 
Choice,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 69, No. 2 (1987), 410. 
26 Naughton, The Chinese Economy, 253. 
27 Ibid., 403. 
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accounts for more investment than any other developing country.28  The vast population 
acquiring Western lifestyles and luxuries also creates the potential for a huge energy 
demand in the future. 
Because China has shown tremendous economic growth, other developing 
countries are looking for ways to emulate China’s success.  This gives China an 
additional measure of influence when dealing with developing countries that are good 
sources of raw materials.  It also gives Beijing the capacity to suggest that China can 
offer something a partner like the United States cannot; a means to grow while 
maintaining political stability in authoritarian or non-democratic countries. 
2. China Goes Global 
There has been a considerable amount of press coverage about China’s foreign 
reserves, particularly in United States currency.  As China becomes a global power and 
expands its influence throughout the economic world, it is building an enormous reserve 
in U.S. dollars.  The International Monetary Fund placed the reserves at $1.46 trillion in 
2006 and estimates reserves as high as $2.19 trillion by 2008.29  The foreign reserve 
holdings have grown tremendously over the last decade and are close to half of all the 
reserves held in the developing world.30  This is only one aspect of China’s emerging 
power and influence in the world today.  The remaining section will describe some ways 
China has expanded into a global power. 
a. Chinese FDI 
Long before the communist revolution, China had been a major exporter 
and a recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI).  The dream of “opening” China’s 
enormous market dominated Western foreign policy toward China since the Opium Wars 
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in the early 1800s31  Some arguments attribute China’s early modernization and 
development to FDI while others blame it for China’s continued backwardness.32  One 
truth that Beijing learned from China’s history is that the contributors of FDI almost 
always see a benefit in influence and profit. 
During the years of Mao’s reign, China’s economy was largely closed to 
the world.  In 1977, one year before the beginning of Deng’s reforms, China position as a 
trading nation was 30th in the world and involved less than $15 billion of total trade.33  
China began to open up to FDI once again in early 1980s and in less than 20 years FDI 
became greater than one tenth of gross domestic capital formation.34  A major shift began 
to occur in the early 1990s as the number of Chinese transnational companies increased 
and as China looked outward for new opportunities.35  Beijing found both the developed 
and the developing world to be full of potential for economic gain and political clout 
though investment.  China’s investments today are global in nature and are often tied to 
both economic and political gain. 
Before 1978, China’s overseas investment was relatively insignificant.  
After the “open” policy began to transform the economy, China’s FDI began at a meager 
$35 million in 1980.36  By 1991, the amount had grown to over $900 million.37  This 
amount grew dramatically to $6.92 billion as of 2005, according to official government 
statistics.38  The official figures do not come close to capturing the full magnitude of 
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outbound FDI because they do not include investments funneled through places like the 
Cayman Islands nor FDI to Hong Kong and Macao.39  Other sources have pegged 
China’s outward flow of FDI as high as $16.1 billion in 2006.40  The same source 
reported that 81 percent of all the cumulative FDI up to 2005 (over $57 billion) 
originated from state-owned enterprises.41 In perspective, this is less than a tenth of the 
outward FDI originating in the United States.42  The increasing overseas investments 
show no sign of slowing as demonstrated in the first quarter of 2007 Chinese FDI had 
already increased 12 percent over 2006 levels.43 
Although China’s outward FDI ranked 17th among all investing countries 
in 2005, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) is 
projecting a significant increase in the near future due to the extremely large foreign 
reserve holdings.44 Also in 2005, China’s outward FDI ranked at least fourth among 
developing countries but may be higher due to incomplete reporting of all activities.45  
While China’s outward FDI is still not a lot compared to the top developed countries, 
considering the size of the economy, foreign reserve holdings, and place as the third 
largest trading nation, China’s FDI could grow to much higher levels in coming years.46 
China’s outward flow of investment is just one aspect of Beijing’s 
growing international reputation and power.  Investments are not devoid of political 
implications.  Chinese media have discussed the growing influence of China in Latin 
America regarding energy sources and the recognition of Taiwan that is closely tied to 
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the inflow of Chinese FDI.47  In 2004, Hu Jintao pledged a massive $100 billion to Latin 
America in the next decade.48  As will be described later, large portions of the 
investments are intended for Venezuela or are in addition to the pledge. 
The growth of FDI is typical of all forms of economic integration with the 
rest of the world.  Generally, the areas receiving FDI also show growth in both Chinese 
imports and raw material exports to China.  An estimated 17 percent of China’s FDI 
flows into the mining industry, which in turn aids China’s growing need for raw material 
imports.49 
b. Arms Exports 
Another way Beijing has expanded China’s global influence is through 
arms exports.  Aside from the obvious economic benefit, offering arms to other countries 
can create political ties and build influence.  Conventional Chinese weapons can be found 
in much of the developing world, even if very few Chinese arms are sold in Latin 
America.  Some research has indicated that China is selling arms in developing countries 
as a “means of enhancing its status as an international political power, and especially to 
obtain access to significant natural resources, especially oil.”50  This seems to fit with the 
sales to Iran, even amidst protest from the United States, and other oil producing 
countries.  Arms sales are an important indication of which countries Beijing considers 
strategically significant to its foreign policy.  As a measure of intent, this makes the offer 
of major sales as significant as actual sales. 
                                                 
47 “OSC Analysis: China Advances Relations With Latin America,” FEA20050624004578 OSC 
Feature, June 27, 2005 https://www.opensource.gov (accessed August 19, 2007). 
48 Saunders, China’s Global Activism, 21. 
49 “Foreign Investment in China,” The US-China Business Council, 
http://www.uschina.org/info/forecast/2007/foreign-investment.html (accessed August 23, 2007). 
50 Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1998-2005 (CRS 
Report for Congress, October 23, 2006), Order Code RL33696. 
 15
China is a proliferator of missile technology as well as a source for 
convention and small arms for many countries.51  In the 1980s, Chinese arms sales were 
primarily for profit.  Jane’s describes the state of arms sales to the Middle East as having 
shifted from strictly commercial interests in the 1980s to a more strategic orientation 
today.52  China is building arms sales relationships with countries that are in Beijing’s 
strategic interests such as Egypt, Yemen, Iran and Algeria.53  All of these are positioned 
to help China protect crucial shipping lanes to protect access to energy or raw materials. 
In a similar vein, Beijing has offered to sell fighter aircraft and other 
weapon systems to Venezuela.  The aircraft offer was turned down in favor of Russian 
fighters; however a deal involving three mobile early warning radars and modern 
communication satellites was agreed upon in 2005.54 China’s weapon sales in Latin 
America are limited, especially compared to the United States and Russia, but the 2006 
sales to Venezuela could indicate an opening market for Chinese arms.55  Most important 
to this discussion is the offer of weapons to Venezuela.  It indicates that Beijing is 
working to expand its influence and build ties with Venezuela in yet another area of 
international relations and not just looking for profit. 
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c. Soft Power 
Soft Power refers to the ability for a state to influence other states purely 
through cultural and ideological means.  The influence is indirect and without coercion.  
For a country to have soft power influence requires a level of international prestige and a 
demonstrated leadership in world affairs.56 
Purely in the realm of international status, Beijing has embarked on 
multiple endeavors to enhance China’s status.  The 2008 Beijing Olympics is likely to 
provide a major boost in global standing and has been called a “coming out” party for 
Beijing.  China is spending a reported $48 billion to promote the Olympics as a symbol 
of its new stature in the world.57  To aid in the promotion, Beijing has enlisted some of 
Hollywood’s best, such as director Stephen Spielberg, to create a remarkable opening 
ceremony.58  Beijing is also billing the event to be a “green” Olympics in an effort to 
downplay the growing ecological crisis in China.59 
In October 2003, the first Chinese manned spaceflight was launched.  The 
Shenzhou V mission, a one-man short duration flight, placed China in the elite group of 
nations to achieve manned space flight.60  Two years later, China conducted a two-man 
five-day space mission.61  Some authors argue that these missions are primarily for 
science and research, while other’s point to their potential military aspects.62  To 
illustrate the positive view China wants to place on such programs one Chinese scholar 
writes, “China’s mastery of manned space flight technology is not a threat to anyone.  
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Rather, it is a significant step in using high technology to advance world peace and 
progress of the Chinese nation.”63 This effort is a big step in sending the message that 
China stands among the great powers of the world, in a peaceful way.  The manned space 
program is a tremendous boost to China’s international image and contributes to 
Beijing’s soft power.64  
Beijing is spending $200 million annually to fund a network of 
international schools to teach the Chinese language.65  This network of Confucian 
Institutes will provide an increasing number of people who are more sympathetic to 
China worldwide.  Considering the direct funding from the CCP’s National Office for 
Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language, it is clear that Beijing sees a benefit to building 
China’s soft power. 
3. China’s Growing Demand for Energy 
a. Oil 
As one energy expert states, “petroleum has proven to be the most 
versatile fuel source ever discovered, situated at the core of the modern industrial 
economy.”66  Beijing certainly understands this and is striving to secure enough of this 
precious resource to meet current and future needs.  China is now the second largest 
energy-consumer in the world after the United States.67  China became a net petroleum 
importer in 1993 and net energy importer in 1996.68  Unlike the United States and other 
developed nations, China lacks sufficient long-term relationships with energy exporters 
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to guarantee an uninterrupted supply.  This leaves Beijing in a tenuous position of 
securing new international oil sources to meet future demands in a market that is 
dominated by the United States. 
Like most countries, the production, importation, and refining of oil is a 
strategic concern for China.  There are three major oil companies in China that control 
almost all aspects of oil production.  These are China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC), the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) and the China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC).69  CNOOC and Sinopec together make up 
95 percent of the refinery capacity in China.  Beijing has not lost control of this valuable 
resource.  All three major oil companies are SOEs in the form of state-controlled holding 
companies.70  This gives Beijing strategic control and influence over the production and 
distribution of oil and allows the government to lend a hand in financing overseas 
production and acquisitions.71  
b. Growing Demand 
Today, China is facing a potential energy crisis to maintain its rapidly 
growing economy.  Although China relies on coal for 75 percent of its electricity 
production and for 69 percent of overall energy usage, it is becoming steadily more 
reliant on oil as demand for energy increases.  China’s excessive coal use is a major 
contributor to the growing ecological crisis.  Particulates from coal plants are blamed for 
widespread respiratory problems and acid rain in China.72 China is not likely to use oil in 
place of coal any time soon.  The estimated 14,000 new cars that hit the road every day 
largely fuels China’s thirst for oil.  It is anticipated that China could have more cars on  
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the road than in the United States as early as 2040.73  Not only will this place an 
additional pressure on the environment, it forces Beijing to increasingly find stable, 
external sources for oil in the future. 
China’s demand for oil has grown much faster than experts predicted at 
the beginning of the decade.  When the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimated 
China’s growing energy demands in 2002, they predicted a 2.7 percent annual growth 
through 2030 with oil demand growing at 3.0 percent.74  Oil use in 2030 was predicted to 
reach 12 mb/d and require 83% to be imported.75  This proved to be far lower than what 
actually occurred in the first half of the decade.  China’s energy consumption growth 
surprised the planners and grew almost twice as fast as was predicted.  The latest IEA 
prediction (as of 2006) places China’s 2030 demand at 20 percent of the world 
consumption.76 
China’s production of 3.8 million barrels per day places it as the 6th largest 
oil producer in the world.77  Domestic oil production is now far below the national 
demand which can only be met via the international market.  Although domestic 
production is increasing, it has little hope of catching up to demand as the rates of each 
continue to diverge. 
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Figure 1.   China’s Oil Production and Consumption, 1986-200678 
Problematically, in 2004 the proven oil reserves in China were estimated 
to provide only 13 years of production at that year’s levels compared to the estimated 40 
years for larger producers.79  Therefore, China must secure even more sources for oil 
imports to meet the rapidly growing demand and to replace domestic production as these 
sources dwindle.  The estimates of limited reserves are not limited to China. The more 
other countries use their reserves, the more dangerous international competition for 
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c. Current Imports 
China’s petroleum imports reached 2.9 million barrels per day (bbl/d) in 
2006.  This was nearly a 16 percent increase from 2005 levels.  The largest percentages 
of imports in 2006 were from Angola, displacing Saudi Arabia as the previous leader in 
2005.  Other major import sources include: Iran, Russia, Oman, Congo, Yemen, 
Equatorial Guinea, and Venezuela.80 
In one year, Venezuelan crude oil imports increased from 21 thousand 
barrels per day (bbl/d) to 90.1 thousand bbl/d.81 As of 2006 Venezuela provided 3 
percent of Chinese oil imports.  On the surface this does not seem like a major shift but it 
could be the beginning of a new trend in Sino-Venezuelan relations.  Hugo Chavez said 
in 2006 that he wants Venezuela to provide half a million bbl/d to China by 2011.82 
In perspective, China’s demand for imported oil is second only to the 
United States.  US daily imports were 13.6 million bbl/d in 2006, approximately four and 
a half times higher than China’s imports.83  The gap between US and China’s imports is 
decreasing.  Last year, China accounted for 38 percent of increased demand as compared 
to the rest of the world.84  As long as this trend continues, China could overtake the 
United States as the world’s dominant oil importer in short order.  
d. Other Raw Material Needs 
Other than coal, China does not have a proportional amount of raw 
materials for both its size and population.  The abundance of coal is offset by a lack of 
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metals and other resources.  This has many Beijing planners concerned as they try to 
secure future economic growth that will depend on access to these resources. 
China has been called the “factory of the world” and requires enormous 
amounts of raw materials to fill its manufacturing role.85  According to David Hale, in 
recent years “China has displaced the United States as the dominant market and price 
setter for copper, iron ore, aluminum, platinum and other commodities.”86  This is not 
only an indication of growing economic prosperity for China but is also indicative of the 
challenges Beijing is faced with to maintain its economic growth.  In the case of refined 
copper, China’s imports have risen from 20,000 tons to 1.2 million tons in 13 years.87  
China’s demand now accounts for 22 percent of the global copper yield.88  Balanced 
against China’s meager six percent of the world’s copper reserves, Beijing’s foreign 
policy is clearly not only about the oil.89 
The need for material is not limited to manufacturing alone.  The rapid 
growth of urban areas in China has fueled an enormous demand for steel, cement and 
other construction-related materials.  China’s imports of iron ore have increased ten-fold 
in barely over a decade.90  As of 2004, some attributed the recent major rise of shipping 
rates as a symptom of China’s demand for raw material in the world market.91 
e. Security Implications for China 
The Chinese Communist Party has placed a major part of its legitimacy on 
economic growth and is therefore facing a growing security challenge.  Beijing cannot 
allow the economy to take a major downturn without risking a social and political 
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upheaval throughout the country.  To maintain economic growth, it is imperative that 
energy and raw material imports are maintained without interruption. 
It is especially critical for the CCP that the flow of oil is maintained, as 
demonstrated previously.  With the hope of safeguarding against disruption, the Chinese 
government has already taken steps toward better security.  Beijing announced in 2005 
the intention to build a strategic reserve from domestic production that would help secure 
the country oil supply.92  The above ground strategic reserves should be completely filled 
by the end of 2008, with total storage reported to be 400 million barrels.93  A former 
energy official said the ultimate goal is to have a 90-day reserve.94  As this will only help 
in the event of minor disruptions or delays, China must find additional means to deal with 
the insecurity of the international environment.   
In one instance, there is evidence that China may not be playing by the 
rules of the international oil market.  In 2006, a Chinese businessman made a clever offer 
to BHP Petroleum in South America after BHP had made a recent oil discovery offshore 
Trinidad.95  The offer was for China to pay for the installation of a second oil platform 
for BHP, with the understanding that all oil from that well would be sold exclusively to 
China at market prices.96  As of this writing, it is unknown how BHP responded to the 
offer, but it does indicate that China is considering unorthodox methods to secure its 
petroleum sources in the future. 
                                                 
92 Fu Jing, “China to build up strategic oil reserves,” China Daily, September 14, 2005, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-09/14/content_477628.htm (accessed September 12, 
2007). 
93 Christopher J. Neely, “China’s Strategic Petroleum Reserve: A Drop in the Bucket,” National 
Economic Trends, (January 2007), 1, also available at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/net/20070101/netpub.pdf (accessed September 12, 2007).  
94 “China's strategic reserve to see oil by year's end,” China View, July 5, 2005, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-07/05/content_3176510.htm (accessed September 12, 2007). 
95 Due to the direct benefit to China rather than a more profit-oriented approach (such as selling the oil 
to the highest bidder rather than exclusively to China) it is reasonable to assume that the Chinese 
businessman was representing Beijing’s interests. 
96 Interview with a BHP security executive, July 2, 2007. The interviewee was involved with the 
Trinidad project in 2006. The executive is no longer with the company. Generally it would be considered 
“by the rules” for oil to be offered to the world market and not designated for a single consumer. In the case 
of Trinidad oil, it would be more appropriate to sell oil to local customers or to the country with the 
appropriate refinery capacity. By locking-up specific resources, China is bypassing the supply-demand 
aspect of the global market and giving other importers fewer options for oil sources. 
 24
The insecurity felt by Beijing is evident in other investments as well.  
Beijing is not willing to rely solely on foreign transportation infrastructure to supply the 
oil needs of China.  Beijing’s goal is for Chinese owned tankers to handle half of all oil 
imports by 2010. 97  The Jiangnan Shipyards Corp is already working with a Canadian 
firm to produce Chinese flagged double-hulled oil tankers to meet the rising demand.98 
Another means to secure oil is through military strength. This could be in 
the form of a navy capable of protecting tanker transit through the Malacca Straits, or of 
deployed ground forces to secure oil production in unstable areas.99  This is not 
necessarily a threat to United States interests as long as there are sufficient oil supplies to 
meet the demand in China and the United States.  Given the projected increase in 
demand, it could become less an issue of common interests and more of competition if 
world production fails to meet the growing demand. 
4. Beijing’s Approach toward Venezuela 
Beijing has quietly built a relationship with Venezuela in recent years.  In the last 
decade, this has become an economic partnership and accounted for a large investment in 
Venezuela by China. Chinese aid packages to Venezuela are considerably smaller than 
the amount of aid sent to Argentine and Brazil.100  However, Venezuela is already 
becoming oil rich compared to the rest of Latin America and is in need of less aid.  
Instead there are many business deals that are creating stronger ties between the two 
countries and building both economies. 
Beijing has the benefit of a strong supporter in Venezuela.  The government of 
Venezuela has taken a highly antagonistic stance towards the United States and has 
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recently implemented nationalization of its foreign-owned oil fields.101  The growing 
political tension between Washington and Caracas creates an international relations 
vacuum for Beijing to exploit. 
Beijing’s growing relations with Venezuela are only inhibited by its reluctance to 
provoke the United States.  China will continue to avoid being dragged into Chavez’ anti-
United States rhetoric and inflammatory accusations.  At the same time, China’s 
relationship with Venezuela will only grow stronger the more FDI and trade deals are 
generated between them.  As China invests more money and depends more on foreign 
supplies of oil it would not be unreasonable to expect China to initiate greater strategic 
cooperation between the two countries to protect its interests. With strong rhetorical 
support from Venezuela, as well as from its own efforts, China’s regional prestige is 
building.  The soft power benefits in Latin America of Venezuelan support could assist 
Beijing’s efforts to co-opt additional strategic allies in the region, or at least help draw in 
previous Taiwan supporters. 
All other concerns for China are mostly peripheral to meeting its energy needs in 
the future.  It is a vital interest of the United States to lure Venezuela away from a Sino-
Venezuelan alliance to protect America’s oil supply and promote the cause of spreading 
liberal democracy in the world.  China is not yet a direct challenge to the United States’ 
overwhelming dominance in Latin America, but that may begin to change in the near 
future. 
B. VENEZUELA 
Venezuela’s past has an effect on its current politics and policies.  The past 
(particularly the Bolivar revolution) has a resonance in present political rhetoric and is 
often referenced by the current leadership.  Venezuela’s historical interaction with China 
is limited to recent times but as it relates to the United States, history matters.  A few key 
points in history will be discussed in this chapter as well as a description of the present 
day leadership and politics in Venezuela. 
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1. Monroe Doctrine 
Venezuela has been a part of the American foreign policy landscape from the 
early years of the Republic.  In 1823, shortly after the Bolivar revolution began in Latin 
America, President James Monroe enunciated the United States policy toward Europe 
and its southern neighbors that became known as the Monroe Doctrine.102  In his address 
to Congress, President Monroe stated that the United States would not allow the 
European powers to further colonize any part of the Americas or interfere in the affairs of 
the Americas.  One perspective is that the intent was to prevent any European powers 
from meddling in America’s backyard.103  The doctrine has been intermittently honored 
and sometimes violated by European powers, however it has remained a starting point (or 
perhaps a fallback position) for American policy makers to justify actions toward Latin 
America in the years since.104 
The United States formally recognized Venezuela as an independent and 
sovereign nation in 1836.105  From the American perspective, this brought Venezuela 
into the fold of the Monroe Doctrine.  Venezuelan leaders began to invoke the Monroe 
Doctrine for the United States to intercede on behalf of Venezuela in disputes with 
European powers.106  When European powers overstepped their welcome in the 
Americas, the United States pushed back with the Monroe Doctrine.  In the 1850s, both 
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U.S. and British warships were common sights in Venezuelan ports as each country 
attempted to leverage markets in their favor.107  Venezuelan officials were careful not to 
lean to one power over the other too strongly for fear of upsetting the balance.  It was 
understood in Venezuelan politics that signing treaties could be seen as an aggressive 
action toward the unsigned party.108  Whether current leadership in Venezuela is 
adopting similar policies (in spite of the rhetoric) or is now leaning more heavily away 
from the United States remains to be seen. 
2. Oil 
At the beginning of the 20th century, oil was discovered in Venezuela.  The first 
years produced only a miniscule amount of oil.  As the importance of this great resource 
began to emerge in the world, Venezuela became a major supplier.  Before the Middle 
Eastern dominance of the oil market, Venezuela was one of the top oil exporters in the 
world.  For most of the twentieth century, oil has been the dominant export for Venezuela 
and a central feature of the economy.109 
Venezuela first began production of oil in 1917, and that year exported 57,000 
barrels of oil. Within only 4 years, exports grew to more than one million barrels.110  This 
booming growth took place during World War I when the global demand for oil was 
dramatically increased to fuel the machines of war.  By 1959, Venezuela provided 14 
percent of the world’s total oil.111  Demonstrating a global leadership among oil 
exporters, Venezuela was a founding member of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960.112 
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Oil has been a major part of the Venezuelan economy for decades.  Recent 
numbers from official U.S. sources states that in 2005 the petroleum industry provided 
approximately 15 percent of Venezuela’s GDP and roughly 90 percent of its exports 
earnings.  Also in 2005, approximately “half of the central government’s ordinary 
revenues” came from the petroleum industry.113  Clearly this is a vital sector of the 
economy and a vital interest to the Chavez regime.  In 2004, the Venezuelan government 
voted to increase its royalties on production of Orinoco heavy crude by international oil 
companies from one percent to over 16 percent.114  As revenues increase, so does 
government interest in the source. 
Venezuela’s reserves of 79.7 billion barrels were considered to make up 
approximately six percent of the world’s proven reserves.115  This is changing as the 
Venezuela Energy and Oil Ministry reports new findings that bring the total proven 
reserves to 100 billion barrels.116  If Venezuelan estimates of more than 200 billion 
barrels still waiting to be certified are accurate, Venezuela may have the largest oil 
reserves in the world.117  It is important to note that some insiders are questioning the 
methods used to certify the actual reserves.118  If the additional estimates of reserves are 
proven, Venezuela’s influence in OPEC and as a supplier to the world’s major economies 
will also likely to increase. 
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3. Politics 
Over the years since Venezuela became an independent sovereign nation, there 
have been a variety of democratically elected governments and military dictators.   In 
1948 the democratic government of Romulo Gallegos was overthrown and replaced by a 
military junta.119  After a rapid succession of junta leaders another military leader took 
control of the election process and claimed victory.  Perez “The General” Jimenez would 
rule for the next six years.120  He was considered a power hungry dictator and despot who 
curtailed liberties and considered the democratic process a nuisance to his agenda.121  
Nevertheless, during his reign, Venezuela was the top oil exporter in Latin America and 
secured new oil deals with the United States.122  There have been some allegations that 
the United States supported the military coup in 1948 so as to maintain good relations 
with Venezuela.  Venezuela was a major trading partner for the United States and it was 
not in the U.S. interest to weaken those ties, even if publicly American leaders criticized 
the military takeover.123 
Finally, in 1958, democracy was restored to Venezuela by a coalition of political 
groups.  The newly elected President Romulo Betancourt was dedicated to democratic 
principles and sought to prevent future military dictatorships from taking hold in 
Venezuela and in all of Latin America.  Known as the Betancourt Doctrine, his policies 
did have an impact in creating an anti-dictatorial movement on the continent.124  Until 
recently, Venezuela remained a strong democracy with civilian leadership.  In 1961, a 
new constitution was drafted to secure the restored democratic traditions and create a 
democratic foundation for future generations.125 
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Venezuelan democracy has been relatively stable from 1958 until the 1990s.  It is 
important to note that Venezuela is accustomed to military leadership and coup attempts.  
This matters when considering the likely success of future transitions to new 
governments and even constitutions.  People’s trust in the democratic system was shaken 
when in 1992, a group of army colonels attempted yet another coup.126  Led by Col. 
Hugo Chavez, the coup was unsuccessful, but it helped lay a foundation for Hugo 
Chavez’s future presidential campaign and subsequent election. 
4. Hugo Chavez 
When Hugo Chavez came into power by popular election in 1998 it signaled a 
new direction for U.S.-Venezuelan relations and even the foundation of Venezuelan 
politics.  Chavez has instituted sweeping changes in almost every sector of the economy 
and has changed the core democratic nature of Venezuelan politics.  Almost immediately 
after the election, Chavez put on the referendum a proposal to rewrite the constitution.  
This was one of many planned steps toward bolstering his own power but placing the 
proposal to referendum deferred the fears that he would create another dictatorship.127 
a. Socialism 
Since his election in 1998, Chavez has repeatedly touted his goal of 
transforming Venezuela into strong socialist state.  A number of steps have already been 
taken toward socialism by the nationalization of many industries that were formerly 
privately owned.  The most important sector of the economy, oil, was largely nationalized 
in 2006, excluding previously invested foreign firms from developing oil fields in 
Venezuela.128  Major companies that provided electric power generation and 
telecommunications were nationalized in the beginning of 2007.129  In May 2007, 
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Chavez said he might nationalize other industries such as banking and steel 
production.130  Recently, Chavez has threatened to nationalize private schools that refuse 
to educate students according to a new system that includes writings of Karl Marx and 
speeches of Fidel Castro.131 
The Chavez government’s takeover of many aspects of the economy in 
Venezuela has two major consequences in Venezuelan politics.  The country is being led 
into socialism and Chavez is attaining greater dictatorial power as the government takes 
control of the major means of production and the economy.  This places a significant 
amount of the oil imports of the United States in the control of a single person who 
repeatedly states his dislike of the United States and its foreign. 
b. Dictator or Liberator? 
When the National Assembly granted Chavez the legal ability to “rule by 
decree” in January 2007, it became clear that Venezuela would continue to stray far from 
democratic institutions established decades earlier.132  It is currently a topic of debate 
whether or not Venezuela is becoming a true dictatorship.  Chavez paints a picture of 
himself as a ‘liberator’ of the lower class and defender of their rights as part of his 
Bolivarian Revolution.  His reform goals are to make the country strong and help bring 
the masses out of poverty. 
A central facet of Chavez’s humanitarian work in Venezuela is the 
misiones (missions) program.  “Missions” is a social services effort, which has given 
food, medical care and other services to the poor of Venezuela since 2003.133  The 
various missions are supported primarily by the large oil revenues that Venezuela has 
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enjoyed in recent years due to high international prices.134  The missions have been 
successful in improving the lives and health for many Venezuelans living in poverty and 
have decreased the numbers of impoverished citizens.  Since Chavez took office, the 
percentage of Venezuelans living below the poverty line has decreased from 49.4 percent 
in 1999 to 37.1 percent in 2005.135  Most of that improvement was after the 
implementation of the missions program. 
The initiative has not been without its political implications for Chavez.  
The official Venezuelan government website has information about the various missions 
interlaced with anti-capitalist rhetoric and strong political commentary against 
“imperialists.”136  Winning over less affluent sectors in Venezuela was a major factor in 
Chavez’s re-election in 2006.  Overall, it has been a positive program for the poor of 
Venezuela.  Critics argue that the missions are not sustainable because of the volatility of 
oil revenue and they do little to change root causes of the conditions for poverty.137  The 
program establishes a precedent for broader socialism in Venezuela and therefore has an 
ideological basis for Chavez. 
On the other hand, Chavez has acted unilaterally to shut down voices of 
dissent.  In June 2007, his government refused to renew the broadcasting license of a 
popular television station. By forcing the closure of Radio Caracas Television, one major 
domestic critic of Chavez was silenced after 53 years of broadcasting.138  Closing a long-
running television station did not just mute one voice, it warned others media companies 
to only report pro-Chavez content to stay in business.  Later in the same month, Chavez 
said in a speech that foreign journalists who criticized his government would be 
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deported.139  Although some analysts have said that this is merely speechmaking and is 
unlikely to be implemented, it also demonstrates a transition away from a democratic 
debate and healthy criticism in journalism in Venezuela. 
Recently, Chavez began touting his immense popularity as a basis for 
constitutional reform that would allow unlimited re-elections.140  This would allow him 
to remain in power for life as long as he retains popular support (or is able to manipulate 
the election process).  This will be an important step in his goals toward socialism and 
possibly dictatorship creating the legal basis for perpetual re-elections and lifelong rule. 
The bigger question is: what are Chavez’s long-term goals for Venezuela 
and the region?  As Chavez garners additional power and continues with his ideological 
attack on the United States, there is a potential for the emerging dictator to become a 
threat to regional stability and the interests of the United States.  It is not difficult to see 
where Chavez would like to see Venezuela go in the future, but it is less obvious what 
China will do to support these goals and be a balancer against traditional U.S. dominance 
in the region. 
c. Stated Goals 
Hugo Chavez has publicly stated his long-term strategic goals on a 
number of occasions.  In summary, he wants a total transformation in Venezuela and all 
of Latin America.  He hopes to overturn the international political framework that has 
been in place for decades and remove the United States from its “hegemonic” position. 
Chavez’s methodology is also openly discussed in Venezuela, and he 
often presents it to the world stage for all countries to consider.  He is a strong believer in 
“fourth generation” warfare as the best means to subvert U.S. dominance.141  He has said 
he intends to someday launch a “super-insurgency” to topple the United States and create 
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a massive socialist state for all of Latin America.  This design has played well in 
domestic politics among the poor in Venezuela and is gaining support in other Latin 
American countries.  It is probably more the idea of change rather than the actual end 
result that is attractive to many disadvantaged people in the region. 
Chavez has been particularly vocal about his desire to align with China to 
create a defensive relationship against the United States. In a 2006 meeting with Chinese 
leaders, Chavez said, “We are creating a strategic alliance with the strength of the Great 
Wall.”142  Statements such as this are a far cry from the U.S. view of Venezuela in the 
context of the Monroe Doctrine.  In the view of the United States, Venezuela has been 
able to count on the Monroe Doctrine as a level of protection from foreign intrusion.  
However, Chavez is leaning toward China for a strategic partnership (or possibly 
alliance) as a means of balancing the overwhelming dominance of the United States in 
Latin America.143 
5. United States/Venezuela Relations 
a. U.S. Energy Imports From Venezuela 
Beyond a shared colonial heritage, the Monroe Doctrine, or geographic 
proximity, the strongest linkage between the United States and Venezuela is the oil 
industry.  At its height in 1960, Venezuela provided half all the oil imported to the United 
States. 144  When the United States became a net oil importer in 1975, Venezuelan oil 
accounted for approximately six percent of all petroleum imports.  After a brief decline in 
significance, Venezuelan oil became a prominent source of oil by 1985 by providing over 
300 thousand barrels a day.  Venezuela’s oil exports to the United States peaked in the 
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mid-1990s at almost 20 percent and have declined ever since the election of Hugo 




Figure 2.   U.S. Oil Imports, 1975-2006. 146 
Although Venezuela is not the largest provider of oil to the United States, 
it is clearly a significant source of crude oil and petroleum products.  Canada remains the 
most significant source of foreign oil to the United States and has increased exports 
dramatically over the last decade.  Saudi Arabia provided 11.8 percent of oil imports to 
the United States, the most out of all the OPEC members.147  Venezuelan imports were 
only marginally lower than Saudi Arabian oil. 
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b. Current Political Differences 
As China’s involvement in Venezuela increases and a larger share of 
Venezuelan oil is exported to countries other than the United States, Washington will lose 
even more influence in the country and the region.  It is in the U.S. interest to maintain 
relations with Venezuela, if not on political levels than at least in terms of economics.  
The less Venezuela depends on the United States for its economic health, the greater the 
risk of conflict in the region due to the volatility of Chavez’s politics and his continental 
aspirations.  Other close allies in the region have already felt threatened by Venezuela’s 
aggressive behavior and will feel even less secure if the influence of the United States 
wanes further.148 
While Chavez is aligning his country closer to China, he is also picking up 
allies in Latin America.  One is Bolivia, where the United States has had large aid 
packages for healthcare, roads and other quality-of-life programs in the past.  Now, with 
the help of petrodollars, Venezuela has become a major aid contributor and is viewed 
more favorably than the United States.149  The turning away from the United States is not 
based solely on Venezuelan aid; U.S. foreign policies and a common ideology with 
Venezuela are also factors in Bolivian disfavor towards the United States.  This gives 
China increasing leverage in the region when its interests are in line with Venezuela’s 
and presents the United States with a potential antagonistic alliance in the south. 
Threats of cutting oil exports to the United States are not confined to 
Chavez’s political rants.  Although he has repeatedly attacked the United States 
government and President Bush personally, there is a growing sense that Venezuela is  
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committed to exporting to other markets.  Venezuela’s oil minister, Rafael Ramirez, 
warned that Venezuela could shift its exports to markets other than the United States 
because of perceived aggression from the latter.150 
Venezuela has demonstrated a willingness to accept financial losses in oil 
revenue for the purpose of political gain.  In 2006, it was reported that Venezuela sold oil 
at subsidized rates to Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Cuba and Uruguay.151  Oil sales of 
100,000 bbl/d to Cuba have been discounted by 40 percent.152  This would indicate that 
the potential loss of revenue due to transportation costs to China would be less important 
for Caracas than the potential political gain. 
C. JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 
For a perspective on China’s future oil demand it should be compared to the 
projected requirements for the United States and Japan.  Although China’s demand is 
growing faster than other big players in the world market, it is not alone in its need for 
more oil to fuel economic growth in the future.  Demand in the United States is projected 
to increase by one percent per year on average until 2030.153  The proven reserves in the 
US offer only nine years of production at present rates.154  This is even more critical than 
in China and suggests that the amount of U.S. imports will rise dramatically in the next 
decade.  China and the United States will be in a similar position as Japan by importing 
nearly all petroleum by 2030. 
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Figure 3.   World’s Top Ten Oil Consumers, 2005155 
In 2006, Japan’s oil imports were 5.2 million bbl/d, nearly twice that of China.156  
Japan’s economy is completely reliant on stable imports and therefore it is in Japan’s 
vital interest to create a stable system for the future.  Unlike the US and China, Japan has 
virtually no domestic production of oil.  Therefore, although Japan is third in 
consumption, it is the second largest importer of petroleum.157  The demand for oil has 
increased very slowly over the last two decades and will not likely grow too fast in the 
future.  Still, with increased demand in other countries, Japan faces a tough road ahead 
since it lacks domestic production as a safety net.  Tokyo has been proactive in preparing 
for this prospect.  In April 2007, Tokyo presented Abu Dhabi at least one billion dollars 
in low interest loans to increase its oil production and secure stable imports for Japan in 
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the future.158  This sort of direct investment is necessary for both the US and Japan to 
meet future needs, but it also ties the economic interests of the importing countries to the 
stability of the invested exporting countries. 
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III. CHINA’S PEACEFUL RISE? 
There is little debate that China is rising fast and becoming a major power in the 
world today.  As China becomes more intertwined with Venezuela (a regime that is 
highly antagonistic towards the United States) it is important to examine China’s growing 
power and influence in the world today.  Does China’s increasing power present the 
United States with a future partner in global affairs or a challenge to national security?  
The importance of Sino-Venezuelan relations to the United States is partly based on 
China’s ability to compete with the United States economically, militarily, and politically 
in Latin America and the world. 
A. NEW ORDER 
1. Economic Power 
China has become such a strong player in the world’s economy that, according to 
a recent article in the Economist, consumer spending in China has grown to the point that 
a recession in the United States need not hurt the global economy.159  Although this 
assertion is not the total picture of the Chinese or the global economy, it does 
demonstrate the transformation China has experienced in recent years.  China is not 
viewed as just having a large GDP but is now being considered in terms of consumer 
spending. 
China’s growing economic power presents developing countries with another 
option for aid, FDI and trade beyond the traditional Western options.  With China, the 
developing countries seeking economic gain can be assured of a non-interference 
approach toward their domestic politics and human rights record.160  Nevertheless, 
Beijing is not above using economic enticements to affect the foreign policies of other 
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nations.  In the 1990s, China used business contacts to gain favorable congressional votes 
for the renewal of China’s most-favored-nation status by purchasing billions of dollars 
worth of U.S. goods.161  Similar practices have continued on to today toward the United 
States.  In addition to using economic power to influence major powers like the United 
States, China is now looking to use the same tools toward developing countries.  In 2004, 
an internal meeting titled “Economic Diplomacy Toward Developing Countries” was a 
step in organizing an investment strategy that bolstered Beijing’s foreign policy goals 
toward developing countries.162 
The incentive for developing countries to build economic ties with China is more 
than just the understanding that Beijing will not interfere in the countries’ internal affairs.    
China’s economy has grown tremendously in the past three decades and may continue its 
rapid growth for the foreseeable future.  The Chinese economy is expected to soon 
surpass than the economy of Germany and take its place as the third largest economy in 
the world.163  With the recent decline in the value of the U.S. dollar, American 
consumers will be buying fewer goods from foreign producers.  This only enhances 
China’s role as an alternate trading partner and possible destination for exports. 
2. Soft Power 
China’s credibility as an economic/political model is enhancing its soft power in a 
way that most liberal-democratic governments would not have believed possible after the 
cold war ended.164  In Latin America, the leadership of both Venezuela and Bolivia are 
viewing China as a model for economic growth and political power.165 In the literature 
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review, Nye’s concept of “soft power” was described as it applied to China.166  More 
than just describing the concept, it is important to understand the potential danger that 
Chinese soft power represents to liberal democracies.  To be sure, China has found a 
number of ways to strengthen its soft power around the world. 
The problematic side of China’s growing soft power is the implications for the 
West.  In a 2006 BBC poll, China was viewed positively by many of the developing 
countries receiving Chinese investment.167  This is coincident with less positive views of 
the United States in many of the same countries.  In Iran, where China has invested over 
$2 billion in infrastructure and energy production since 2002, China was viewed 
positively by 66 percent of those polled.168  Brazil is one of Latin America’s larger 
recipients of Chinese FDI and the poll reflects a 57 percent positive view toward Chinese 
influence compared to only 33 percent positive view of the United States.169 Investment 
is certainly not the only factor in some countries’ positive view of China over the United 
States; however it does demonstrate that China is able to capitalize on the low opinions 
some countries have toward the United States. 
The Chinese model of illiberal capitalism is gaining influence in Latin American 
and particularly with Venezuela.170  Among the developing world, China is an economic 
success story that is admired by many.  For the leaders of many developing nations, it is 
difficult to argue with the appeal of China’s tremendous economic growth coupled with 
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and Venezuela, other Latin American countries could lean toward China and away from 
the United States.172  If China’s model of illiberal capitalism continues to spread in Latin 
America, the United States could see its influence continue to wane. 
3. Investment in Latin America and Venezuela 
China’s investments are usually considered to be without political strings 
attached.  This has brought criticism from Western countries when China invests in 
(supports) countries whose governments the United States would like to see sanctioned 
such as Sudan and Iran.  Although, it may appear that no demands are placed on the 
recipients of China’s FDI this is not the case.  All that can be said is that there are little if 
no domestic demands placed on recipients of Chinese FDI.  The strings that come with 
FDI are found in the international arena such as in the recognition of Taiwan or votes 
within the United Nations.173  Most important, FDI comes with an expectation for access 
to resources, and possibly markets, in the future. 
In Latin America, China has invested billions.  Publicly released numbers from 
1993 to 2005 total more than $34 billion but the reality could be far more.  The greatest 
amount of Chinese FDI went to Argentina totaling over $19 billion (over half of all Latin 
American investment).  Most of these investments went toward infrastructure projects 
and resource production that facilitates exports to China.  According to official reports 
Venezuela has received $1.63 billion but has been promised a much greater figure in the 
near future.174  For perspective, the U.S. FDI in Venezuela was over $7 billion in 2006 
and close to $30 billion in Latin America.175  Although the total U.S. direct investments 
abroad is over $2 trillion worldwide (which greatly overshadows Chinese FDI), it is not 
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focused on energy resource exporters is the case with China.176  Therefore, although 
China’s overall outbound FDI is significantly smaller than U.S. FDI, China is taking 
advantage of a niche with regard to investments to secure energy sources. 
There are many more deals between China and Venezuela (brokered at the state 
level or state-owned enterprises) that are not included in these figures, such as the $1.3 
billion deal for 18 VLCC tankers that China State Shipbuilding Corporation and others 
are constructing for Venezuela.177  These would help facilitate Venezuela’s goal of 
diversifying its customer base beyond the dominant United States.  Also, there is another 
$36 billion of proposed financing for infrastructure projects in Venezuela and other 
unnamed Latin American countries. 178  This sizable funding commitment is through a 
private financing company in Hong Kong that is not directly traceable to Chinese 
government investment.179  There is evidence that this money is coming from non-private 
interests in China and is therefore politically motivated.180  Therefore, the amounts of 
Chinese investment in Venezuela is exceptionally ambiguous as many very large 
investments are often funneled through tax havens (such as Hong Kong or the Cayman 
Islands) and go unreported in official statistics.181 Arguably, this may be suggestive of 
the levels and types of energy related investment that can be expected in the future. 
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B. NATIONALISM AND THE PROMISE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
1. What is Chinese Nationalism? 
Since the revolution in 1949 and the passing of the Mao era in 1976, the original 
ideology of the communist party has been slowing transforming into something new.  
Nationalism is taking the place of communism as the common bond to unite all Chinese 
people and defend the CCP’s legitimacy.182  As it is still a developing phenomenon, it is 
difficult to predict how nationalism will ultimately affect China but its influence is 
already significant in China’s foreign policy.183 
Nationalism is the way in which a group of people defines itself as an entity.  It 
refers to a shared loyalty to the nation and typically creates a distinction apart from (or 
elevation above) other peoples that are outside of the nation.  Nationalism creates a 
shared sense of belonging but can also create a heightened us-versus-them mentality 
toward international relations.  It is during times of national crisis or shortage that 
nationalist movements can become a dangerous force in foreign policy. 
To clarify, there are multiple forms of nationalism in China.  The original 
nationalism movement began in the early 20th century with the Han majority whose goal 
was to overthrow the ruling Qing Dynasty.184  Later this became an elitist attitude that 
was of such concern that Mao Zedong wrote that “we must go to the root and criticize the 
Han chauvinist ideas” out of concern that it would damage the Party.185  Today the 
Party’s primary concern of ethnic nationalism in China is prevalent in the minority ethnic 
populations such as Tibetans, Uygurs, and Mongols.  This form of ethnic nationalism is a  
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serious cause of concern for the central government due to the potential for increasing 
unrest and the movement for autonomous governance or out-right secession from 
China.186   
The focus in this work is on the growing nationalist movement that is in support 
of the CCP (and has been used by the state to achieve political goals) but also has the 
potential to push Chinese foreign policy further than might be in the most pragmatic 
interest of the state.187  Considerable attention in literature on Chinese nationalism has 
predominantly focused on current conditions and predictions regarding Taiwan 
independence and Japanese war crimes.188  Also Chinese nationalism has been directed at 
U.S. imperialism and western domination.  This could be a significant source of 
instability in Northeast Asia and be the cause of increased tension with the West if 
allowed to go too far. 
In looking back to WWII, nationalism was a significant precursor of military 
aggression in both Nazi Germany and Meiji Japan.  In both examples, the states were 
driven to expand territorial claims as a prerogative of a great people, to provide resources 
for further growth and to take their rightful place in the world.  Although the ascendancy 
of the Nazi party was not the original objective of the nationalist movement in Germany, 
the prevalent nationalism is attributed to establishing the conditions for Nazism to rise.189 
In defining the “new” nationalism in China, Peter Hays Gries offers some 
defining elements.  As a recent historical element, nationalists in China often refer to the 
“century of humiliation” that China endured at the hands of the west.190  This victim 
mentality presents the nationalist with a fear of future domination and the drive to stand 
up to the West.  It creates an increased suspicion of the United States (and Japan, which 
is also lumped in with the “West” in this context) that make negotiations more difficult. 
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Another element is the nationalist response to Huntington’s “Clash of 
Civilizations” theory that points to conflict between Asia (typified in China) and the West 
(United States).  Nationalist use this theory to both illustrate the threat the United States 
poses for China and as evidence that China has grown in global significance and has 
become a world power.191  Notably, in general the Chinese literature on the “clash” is 
resolved with a Chinese victory.192 China’s leadership is promoting nationalism among 
the people as a political tool for legitimacy while attempting to contain it from growing 
out of control.193 
2. The Promise of Economic Growth 
The CCP has strayed a long way from its communist roots in the interests of 
economic growth.  Deng Xiaoping’s concept of a rising tide that lifts all boats describes 
how shifting to a market economy as an interim stage of development was needed to 
bring China up to the level of the developed world.  Legitimacy of the CCP is now based 
on nationalism and the promise of economic growth and building a wealthy society.  This 
goal of achieving national wealth and rising to join the developed world has become a 
key component of the Chinese national self-respect.194  It is not necessarily a promise of 
individual wealth, although there is some expectation of this by most individuals, as 
much as for society as a whole.  This places an enormous pressure on the CCP planners 
to maintain economic growth above almost all other concerns.  Many China watchers 
have argued that this emphasis on the economy makes China a benign rising power 
because conflict would hurt global trade and therefore the Chinese economy.  This 
ignores the possibility that an economic crisis would inflame the nationalist rhetoric and 
force the CCP into potentially dangerous action if the blame is placed on imperialist 
powers.195 
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3. China Against the World 
When the world’s demand for oil drives global demand above available 
production, the focus of Chinese nationalism could become other consumers’ (as in the 
United States and Japan) unfair domination of the oil market and imperialist control of 
resources.  Adding nationalist demands to an already tense situation can increase the 
pressure for Beijing to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy. 
Beijing’s leadership would not likely risk armed conflict with the United States or 
even expeditionary adventurism to claim oil based solely on nationalist sentiment.  
However, the regime has also promised economic development (along with restored 
national pride) as a source of legitimacy.  If both of these ideals are challenged by a 
significant shortage of the most basic economic building blocks it could bring into 
question the very legitimacy of the CCP among the most affected sectors of the 
population with a real voice, the urbanites. 
Beijing will go to great lengths to avoid such a loss of legitimacy and will not risk 
the supremacy of the CCP in China.  Therefore, with no other options available and 
facing tremendous pressure from the domestic front, a significant oil shortage could 
provoke Beijing into using the PLA to secure overseas sources for oil.  One means of 
using the PLA would be to send troops to provide security against attacks while 
guaranteeing a continued export to China.  This could take place in Africa, the Middle 
East or presumably in Latin America.  Although it is unlikely that Beijing would seek 
outright conflict with the United States there are scenarios that could drag both countries 
into a conflict. 
While the United States may not be willing to use its military to overtly capture 
oil sources (preferring long established trading relationships) it has proven its resolve to 
defend oil-exporting countries from invasion.196  Similarly the United States is unlikely 
to stand by while China aggressively pursues oil with military force.  By the same 
measure, if the United States has cause to become militarily involved in an oil-exporting 
nation that contributed to satisfying China’s demand, China may find it difficult to stand 
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by and allow such involvement without pressure to defend the interests of a strategic 
partner.  For example, if Washington opts to take military action against Iran, a key 
source of oil to China, Beijing might sell off its massive U.S. currency holdings to hurt 
the U.S. economy.  Potentially, Beijing could also supply Iran with arms and asymmetric 
war-fighting technology that would hamper U.S. efforts and build stronger ties with Iran 
in the future.  Similar risks would be present in Venezuela as China invests more in the 
region and becomes more dependent on Venezuelan oil. 
4. How Does Nationalism Affect Policy? 
The rise of nationalism in China has gone well beyond the control of the 
government.197  As nationalism grows beyond the Communist Party’s manipulation, it 
becomes its own political force within China that must be both managed and placated at 
the national level.  Beijing understands that nationalism is good for maintaining 
legitimacy; however, it may also restrict Beijing’s political options in foreign policy in 
the future.  At some level, policy-makers are forced to consider how the nationalist 
writers will view policy decisions and to be cognizant of “popular nationalist 
demands.”198 
Nationalist sentiment develops its own internal soft power quality that influences 
the national agenda and foreign policy by influencing the decision-making individuals.199  
Just as writers in the United States influence U.S. politicians, Beijing politicians are also 
influenced by the writings of Chinese nationalists, especially as these sentiments grow 
more popular.200 
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Nationalism is becoming a force that must be accounted for in policy decisions in 
and out of China.  Within the context of this paper, it could become a significantly 
destabilizing influence in a resource-constrained environment.  If the nationalist writer is 
presented with a damaged economy due to unavailable energy resources, the natural 
response will be to assign guilt to another party.  The government is one obvious 
scapegoat, however it would be in the CCP’s interest to subvert such a line of speculation 
and promote other options.  The next option for the nationalist (and one that is even more 
attractive) would be to blame a foreign power, such as the United States.  It is not 
difficult to imagine calls for fighting back against the imperialist hegemonic powers that 
are stealing oil that rightfully belongs to China. 
A previous analysis of China’s nationalism in 1998 proposed that nationalist 
sentiment would not force the government into adopting an aggressive foreign policy in 
the near future.201  The primary argument given was the overwhelming importance given 
to economic growth by the CCP.  What was not considered is the impact of nationalism 
in the face of stalled economic growth due to perceived foreign obstruction.  In this 
scenario, nationalistic pressure could have an influence on policy options to respond to 
the U.S. dominance in oil consumption. 
C. REGIONAL HEGEMON:  HOW LARGE IS THE REGION? 
In a “globalized” world, the concept of regional geographic hegemony is losing 
traction as a worthwhile concept for understanding international relations.  The 
interconnectivity in the world today does not lend itself to geographic divisions of major 
powers in the same way that it did previously.202  Put simply, the world is getting smaller 
and region is defined more in terms of shared values and economic interdependence than 
geographic position. 
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With modern communication, rapid transportation and the increasing presence of 
transnational companies, the legitimacy of the traditional Westphalia system is becoming 
debatable.  Environmental concerns have become a major concern in many countries but 
are not limited by human-imposed political borders.  The mere existence of the debate of 
the future significance of the nation-state decries the transition from the local to the 
global throughout the world.  Beijing is adamant about maintaining sovereignty in the 
Westphalian sense, but is also facing new international conditions that require a more 
global approach.203 
China’s region in not simply geographically defined, but is also economic.  With 
growing economic interests in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, China’s 
“region” can be seen as considerably greater than merely East Asia.  This would imply 
that China’s region is therefore defined by junior strategic partners, countries that are 
especially receptive to China’s “authoritarian capitalism” model, sources of raw 
materials, and trading partners.  When all of these factors are present in a country, it 
should be considered as a definite member of the Chinese hegemony club, no matter 
where it is located geographically. 
Venezuela would be considered entirely within China’s influence if it did not 
export a majority of its oil to the United States.  Already, Hugo Chavez has indicated his 
interest in aligning with China as a strategic relationship and Venezuela is becoming a 
major trading partner and recipient of Chinese FDI.  China’s partnership with Venezuela 
shows the expansiveness of China’s region and the intertwining with the international 
considerations of the United States.   
D. MILITARY MODERNIZATION 
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been undergoing significant 
modernization for over two decades.  It has been a long road, from its roots as the 
military arm of the Communist Party, to a modern fighting force able to challenge other 
modern militaries in the world.  These reforms in the military have required substantial 
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investment and dedication on the part of the leadership to change its way of thinking and 
create a modern military force.  China has increased its military spending budget by as 
much as 17.8 percent in 2007 and has maintained a yearly double-digit budget increase 
since 1989.204  Outside of the PLA, the 2007 central PRC budget report includes a 20.1 
percent increase in science and technology research.205  At the same time the PLA has 
trimmed its numbers from over 4 million to 2.3 million.206  Cutting personnel allows for 
more reinvestment in retained quality personnel for education and training requirements.  
Although Beijing’s spending on the PLA is considerably less than what the United States 
spends on its military, it appears that the PLA is receiving the funding to progress 
towards its modernization goal. 
Since the reforms of the Deng era to today, it has often been the case that China is 
guided by economics and nationalism rather than Communist ideology.  This translated 
into the military modernization of the PLA as well.  While the PLA is not a for-profit 
venture (at least not since 1998 PLA reforms207) there is still a lot that can be inferred by 
where the money is spent.  The central PRC budget is not likely to invest in military 
capabilities that the Party leadership does not deem vital to national interests.  The 
question could be, “what does China want to do with its modernizing 2.4 million man 
military?”  Perhaps the question even more important to this thesis is, “How will China 
use its military when threatened with a severe energy shortage?” 
China may not have the capability to fight the United States head on and become 
the next super-power in a uni-polar world, at least not with the same doctrine the US 
military follows.  However, China is developing a credible asymmetric force that could 
make U.S. military action extremely difficult and costly in some circumstances.  For 
example, Beijing is developing the capability to deny the United States’ ability to support 
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Taiwan in a conflict.208  The recent acquisition of Kilo diesel attack submarines and new 
Sovremennyy-Class destroyers from Russia give the PLAN a credible ability to prevent 
United States aircraft carriers from coming to Taiwan’s aid in a straits crisis.  One recent 
article in a PLA newspaper describes techniques that could be used to counter “carrier-
borne early warning aircraft” that includes asymmetric tactics such as jamming and 
“ambush” attacks.209  These capabilities, coupled with the increasing economic ties 
between the United States and China, may be enough to keep the most powerful military 
out of the fight if Taiwan declares independence. 
As a near-team goal of military modernization, Beijing wants the capability to 
prevent a Taiwanese secession.  Along with sea denial platforms to counter U.S. 
intervention, the PLA has upgraded its short-range ballistic missile capability near the 
Taiwan Strait and continues training for amphibious landings.  Beijing has invested in 
asymmetric information-warfare technology that could make Taiwanese resistance 
extremely difficult.210  Although the PLA has a considerable way to go before it is able to 
stage a successful amphibious assault against a resisting enemy, training and war-gaming 
such a scenario leaves little doubt that this is a prominent goal of modernization. 
Many of the same technologies and tactics could be used by the PLA to defend 
overseas investments as long as the host nation is supportive.  Oil exporters have seen 
America’s ability to project power in Iraq and certainly understand their own 
vulnerability.  Given Chavez’s continual verbal attacks against the United States and calls 
for abandoning U.S. currency in OPEC, it would not be surprising if Venezuela sought 
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additional security from China.211  With access to port facilities in Venezuela, the same 
tactics that would prevent U.S. intervention in Taiwan could be an effective counter to 
U.S. dominance in Latin America. 
Other goals of China’s modernization program include the ability to project 
power to protect maritime economic interests, capable self-defense forces (nuclear and air 
defense) and some expeditionary forces.212  Although the primary focus of the 
modernization may be Taiwan, China is not ignoring its other security interests.  When 
matching the United States capability system for system, China is a long way from 
reaching equivalency.  However, assessing technological capability based on asymmetric 
warfare principles (such as sinking a carrier with a submarine-launched missile or using 
anti-satellite missiles) it begins to look like a more credible technological threat.213  A 
recent study of the computer-based information-warfare capabilities of the PLA revealed 
a powerful information and communication denial capability that could hamper the U.S. 
military from utilizing its technological advantage in a conflict and thereby level the 
playing field or use the capability as a form of blackmailed peace.214 
The ability to secure the energy resources in the South China Sea is another 
priority of China’s military modernization.  Beijing would prefer a peaceful resolution in 
the Spratly Islands dispute, but it is not out of the realm of possibility that China would 
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use military force to end the territorial dispute.215  This is not simply a regional issue.  
Once China demonstrates a willingness to use force to secure energy resources locally, it 
would signal a change in how China and the world view the PLA.  As the world’s 
demand for oil increases, it becomes a critical political issue for every oil-producing and 
oil-importing nation.  The need to establish peaceful solutions is vital to China’s interests 
as well as in the United States and Japan. 
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IV. INDICATIONS OF THREAT TO UNITED STATES 
There have been a number of papers written on China’s growing interest in Latin 
America.216  Most have suggested that there is no significant threat to the United States 
and some have gone so far as to point to the positive nature of China’s involvement.  This 
chapter will look at some of the arguments used to discredit China’s potential threat to 
the United States as well as provide some other indicators that should be monitored in the 
future.  No one indicator is sufficient to establish a direct threat to U.S. national interests; 
hence, these should all be monitored and evaluated in context with the other factors. 
A. POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITY 
A critical point of departure for China’s foreign policy would be the demonstrated 
ability to project power beyond its home waters or airspace.  Although there have been no 
solid examples of this, there is the potential for Chinese military power projection in the 
near future in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. 
1. Demonstration of Power Projection Beyond China 
Beijing has long been engaged with Burma and is the only major supporter of the 
military junta.  In recent years, China has provided financial and technical assistance to 
improve, construct and modernize port facilities in Burma.  The projects include 
improved naval facilities on Coco Island in the Bay of Bengal, runway extensions that are 
suitable for use by the PLA as well as Burmese forces and the introduction of Chinese-
made signals intelligence equipment.217 
Although Beijing has not reportedly used the facility upgrades in Burma for 
military power projection, it has created the capacity to do so in the future.  Unlike most 
countries that receive FDI and foreign aid from China, Burma is not a significant source 
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of energy resources for China.  In fact, Burma’s oil consumption exceeds production by 
almost 400 percent.218  However, there is a proposal in progress to construct an oil 
pipeline across Burma to China as a means of bypassing the potentially treacherous 
routes through the Malacca Straits.219  The pipeline would begin in Sittwe, where 
construction is underway to allow access to deep-water vessels such as VLCCs or large 
naval ships, as well as a similar Chinese-funded port 60 miles south.220  Additional 
projects are projected to be capable of supporting Chinese submarines operating in the 
region.221 
All of this construction suggests that Beijing may be interested in protecting 
energy investments (Burma-China pipeline) with military power.  Considering the far 
greater investments in Venezuela and Latin America for oil production and 
transportation, it is not unlikely that a similar pattern of investment in military 
construction will follow.  It will not become a critical point of debate in the United States 
until after China places forces in Latin America, at which point the United States will be 
faced with limited options. 
2. Military Exercises With Venezuela 
As of this writing, there have not been any joint military exercises between China 
and Venezuela.  In isolation, such an exercise would not be sufficient to call the 
relationship a threat. In fact, China has conducted military exercises with many countries 
that are also considered relatively friendly toward the United States. 
However, an exercise with Venezuela would have to be considered within the 
context of other factors.  Chavez’s continual venomous rants against the United States as 
well as increasing oil cooperation would make a military exercise a dangerous signal.  
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Additionally, Venezuela’s proximity to the United States could give additional leverage 
to Beijing if Sino-U.S. relations were to sour.  It has already been discussed in Jane’s 
Sentinel Security Assessment that Venezuela could be a future location for Chinese 
lasers.222  Forward-based lasers could be used to disrupt American satellites that are 
essential to the U.S. economy and would give Beijing a strong coercive stick. 
There are a number of ways that increased military interaction between China and 
Venezuela would be problematic for the United States.  Military interaction could be in 
the form of forward basing of PLA assets in Venezuela, access to port facilities for the 
PLAN or joint exercises demonstrating military cooperation and combined defense 
planning.  Any of these cases would be an indication of increased threat for the United 
States and warrant careful monitoring. 
B. WORLD OIL PRODUCTION CRISIS 
As a general rule, today’s system of oil imports and exports has been relatively 
stable among the major importers over the last half century.223  Aside from a few 
glitches, global oil production has grown in harmony with demand.  This system will not 
last forever.  The world’s proven oil reserves are estimated at approximately 1.3 billion 
barrels.224  At the present rate of consumption, this will last for another 39 years.  
However, according to the peak oil theory, the rate at which the oil can be produced will 
decline well before the oil runs out.225  The good news is that this will make oil last much 
longer than 39 years.  Unfortunately, it also means that at some point in the future the 
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world’s demand for oil could far outpace total production.  In a purely economic sense 
this would cause prices to skyrocket.  However, oil is highly intertwined with politics and 
therefore would also likely cause tension or even conflict as the larger oil importers to 
attempt to acquire a greater share of the dwindling supply. 
Estimates for the timing of peak oil vary dramatically, ranging from years to 
decades before it becomes a serious issue.226  Few reputable reports suggest that this will 
not happen.  The most pessimistic reports by some prominent geologists is that the world 
has already reached peak production levels in 2005 and is already slipping.227  This could 
produce very dramatic oil shortages in the next few years and would be potentially 
disastrous for not only the Chinese economy, beyond China, a sudden shift in the 
structure of the oil market will cause major disruptions in many economies in the world. 
The arrival of peak oil is likely to be a watershed moment in Sino-American 
relations, especially as they relate to Venezuela and other oil exporters.  When both 
countries are clamoring for oil to meet their demand, it will be up to Venezuela to decide 
which country it will support.  If the rhetoric from Chavez is to be believed, the United 
States could lose a significant source of oil. 
C. VENEZUELAN POLITICS  
Politics and oil are a dangerous combination.  The more China becomes reliant on 
Venezuelan oil and Chavez’s support, the greater potential there is for increased tension 
and conflict in Latin America. When oil is traded freely in a market-based system, there 
is less potential for open conflict; however, when political influence is used as a tool to 
acquire oil, the quest for oil becomes a dangerously competitive national issue among oil 
importers.  Venezuela is already promising to export one million bbl/d to China by the 
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year 2012.228  This is in spite of a lack of refinery capability in China to process 
Venezuelan oil.  Therefore, politics is already a playing a major role in Venezuelan 
exports, adding instability to the system.  Chavez’s continual condemnation of U.S. 
foreign policy and promises to export to China suggest that Venezuela may not be a 
reliable source of oil for the United States in the coming years. 
The risk for China is oil that acquired via political means is a less stable supply 
than if based purely on market incentives.  This creates an artificial sense of energy 
security, subject to greater risk of sudden upsets and upheavals.  If Chavez provides a 
significant portion of China’s imports in the future, it is to China’s peril if he loses his 
grip on power and the incoming regime is less supportive of China and interested in 
rebuilding economic ties with the United States.  This would be a likely reason why 
China might use coercive military force in Latin America to preserve a dictatorial regime 
that will maintain the trading relationship. 
D. CHINESE OIL IMPORT CAPABILITY 
Presently there is no feasible means for Venezuela to ship oil large amounts of oil 
directly to China in lieu of the United States.  First of all, the demand for oil in the United 
States is far greater than the demand in China.  This will change as China’s thirst for oil 
increases and world production begins to wane.  Timelines for this model vary; however 
it is largely undisputed that both will happen.229  Other factors that prevent Chinese 
imports of Venezuelan oil include: a lack of proper refineries in China, a lack of Chinese 
oil-tankers that can traverse the Pacific, a lack of capacity of the Panama canal to handle 
large tankers, and a lack of an east-west pipeline to connect the Atlantic to Pacific.  All of 
these factors will be addressed in this chapter. 
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1. Construction of Heavy Crude Refinery Capacity 
There have not been any reports that China is building oil refinery capacity to 
handle Venezuelan crude at this time.  However, this may be less of an impediment to 
China than it would seem.  Considering that the refineries in the United States that can 
process Venezuela’s oil are owned by Venezuela, it would not be surprising for 
Venezuela to build new refineries in China to encourage oil trade. This would have to be 
handled delicately by Beijing to protect relations with the United States, but China has 
already demonstrated a willingness to build refineries for difficult grades of crude oil.  
The Chinese oil company Sinopec signed a joint-venture deal with Exxon and Aramco to 
build oil refinery capacity in China to handle the high-sulfur heavy crude from Saudi 
Arabia.230  Although this deal is not intended for Venezuelan crude, there is not reason to 
see sulfur content as a major impediment for China’s future imports from Venezuela.  
The Aramco deal provides some evidence that China will build whatever refinery 
capacity it needs to secure imports and is not limited to the sweet crudes that most 
importers prefer. 
Also, China has already shown a willingness to adapt to inferior qualities of fuel 
imports from Venezuela. China is already a major recipient of Venezuelan orimulsion 
exports.231  This mock-oil fuel is used in some Chinese power generation facilities but is 
largely shunned by most countries due to the excessive pollution it generates.  The 
orimulsion industry accounts for an additional 6.5 metric tons in Venezuelan fuel 
exports.232 Therefore, the argument that China will not import Venezuela’s “heavy 
crude” because it lacks the proper refineries is baseless considering the adaptability China 
has demonstrated in building an industry on orimulsion.  If Beijing can build plants to 
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burn Venezuelan orimulsion, simply because it was available, there is little doubt that 
China would be capable of building refineries for heavy crude when the need exists.233 
2. Construction of Tankers That Can Traverse the Pacific 
Today, China does not have sufficient VLCC ships that can safely traverse the 
Pacific Ocean.  China’s tanker fleet is mostly comprised of smaller, coastal ships that are 
unsuitable for long oceanic transits.  This will soon change.  The Ministry of 
Communications water transport department has recently said that China will be building 
additional oil tanker capacity to accommodate the rising demand.234  This new push for 
tankers (possibly as many as 90) is not only for the in-land waterways-capable tankers as 
were previously built but is now for VLCC capable of oceanic transit.  The government 
ministry has asked the Dalian Shipbuilding Industry Company to place a priority on 
oceangoing carriers and cites oil insecurity as a factor for increasing Chinese-flagged 
VLCCs.235 
By increasing China’s tanker fleet, Beijing will become less dependant on 
international carriers to deliver its much-needed oil.  Increased import capability offers 
Beijing more options in dealing with international upsets in the flow of oil to China.  
Without the tankers, military options to secure oil imports would be impossible due to 
likely international sanctions and refusal of foreign tankers to carry oil to China.  This 
will no longer be as significant of a concern for Chinese planners. 
3. East-West Oil Pipeline 
China may have already found at least one possible solution to the east-west 
transit problem with a U.S.-based consortium.  R.I.O Systems, Inc. is involved in 
multiple pipeline projects in Mexico, Central and South America.  The initial project 
involves a north-south pipeline and distribution infrastructure in Mexico.  However, long-
                                                 
233 Ellis, U.S. National Security Implications, 7. The need may be soon if Venezuela follows through 
on the previously mentioned promise to export one million barrels per day to China by 2012. 
234 Winnie Lee, “China builds own fleet to handle oil imports; Maritime transport capability seen as 
energy security issue,” Platts Oilgram News 85, No. 117, June 15, 2007, 3.  
235 Ibid. 
 64
term plans include an east-west pipeline (most likely in Guatemala) with terminals for 
VLCCs on each side of the isthmus.  Toward this effort, a Chinese company based out of 
Hong Kong has pledged an initial payment of $36 billion to begin construction of the 
project.236  This not only highlights Chinese interest in the east-west flow of oil, but also 
shows that “official” numbers on Chinese investments fail to include the full scope of 
China’s interests in Latin America. 
Once complete, this pipeline would present Venezuela some new options for oil 
customers.  Venezuelan oil can be sold to China with far lower transportation costs than 
without the pipeline.  Whether this diverts a significant percentage of current U.S. 
imports to Chinese buyers would become more a matter of politics rather than one of 
geography.  This represents a significant shift in oil politics between the United States 
and Venezuela and gives Chavez some new leverage over the U.S. economy. 
E. OTHER REGIONS 
China’s actions on other continents may provide some indication for the future of 
China’s involvement in Latin America.  Amid the controversy of China’s support of 
unpopular regimes lie some clues to what its response to a crisis in Latin America might 
be.237  In the case of Iran, China has continued to show support for the regime in spite of 
U.S. concerns over that country’s nuclear issues.  In Sudan, while the United Nations has 
pressed for intervention to stop the 2007 genocide in Darfur, China signed a deal to pay 
for a new presidential palace and has allegedly provided weapons to the oppressive 
regime.238  Again, Sudan is a country rich in oil resources and a large recipient of 
Chinese investment.  As an indicator for future action in Venezuela, China’s actions in 
other oil producing regions are worth careful monitoring and observation. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. CHINA’S AMBITION 
Seemingly endless literature has been produced attempting to ascertain China’s 
ambition.  Some writers weave fantastic tales to show how Beijing has a diabolical grand 
strategy for the world.  Others portray China as a benign giant emerging peacefully to one 
day take its place among the great powers with good intentions all the way.  The reality is 
that the innermost sanctum of the Communist Party leadership is closed to outside 
observation.  Party meetings to decide major policy are not open to public scrutiny and 
Western observers have no way of knowing what is being planned by the CCP or what 
options are considered on the table. Whether one chooses to see a growing menace with 
evil plans, or to believe the party’s proclamations of harmonious societies and good 
neighbor policies, it is impossible to know its agenda with certainty. 
What can be analyzed and evaluated are the pressures that the CCP is facing and 
what options are available to China’s leadership.  Whether the CCP has a grand strategy 
of replacing the United States as the only superpower or merely becoming the regional 
hegemon has little bearing on the potential threat that needs to be addressed when Beijing 
is faced with a major shortage of energy resources. To maintain the survival of the 
regime, the Party cadre will likely consider any available tool, including military power, 
as they determine the course China will take in meeting those needs. It is vital for the 
United States and every oil-importing nation to ensure that there are available options for 
every nation (including China) to resolve disputes over excessive oil demands.  The last 
section of this chapter will describe one possible solution to resolving future disputes by 
establishing a framework today.  
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B. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
1. Engage Latin America? 
The flip side of the Monroe doctrine concept of preventing external influence in 
the Americas is the responsibility to meet the needs in Latin America.  China’s growing 
influence in Venezuela is facilitated by the region’s perceived ambivalence of 
Washington’s motives towards Latin America in general and Venezuela in particular.  
Unless the United States is prepared to become truly isolationist and withdraw all of its 
interests in Latin America, there needs to be greater emphasis and aid focused on 
bolstering relationships with all Latin American countries.  Chavez is popular among the 
poor in Venezuela precisely because his predecessors made little effort to help the poor or 
to resolve the issue of poverty in the countryside. 
As long as Hugo Chavez remains in power, it may be too late to really make a 
significant impact in Venezuela.  However, it is not too late to engage Venezuela’s 
neighbors to minimize Chavez’s regional influence. If the surrounding countries do not 
support Chavez’s anti-American stance and can rely more heavily on the United States 
for aid and support, the impact of China’s investment in the region can be reduced. 
2. Need to Reduce U.S. Oil Dependency 
The United States has an absolute dependency on foreign oil.  In the 2006 State of 
the Union Address, President George W. Bush stated, “America is addicted to oil.”239  It 
is almost impossible to find an American industry that is not dependent on oil at some 
level.  This can be viewed as both a strategic strength (because of the massive economy it 
creates) as well as a strategic vulnerability (in the case of major interruption or eventual 
depletion).  While abundant oil has been a foundation of America’s rise to superpower 
status, it has also become a major driver of U.S. foreign policy since the end of the Cold 
War. 
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Many of the small oil producers are now leaning toward non-U.S. markets to sell 
their oil and oil products.  In turn, the United States is forced to rely more heavily on oil 
from a few large oil-producing sources.  Although this does not lesson the total pool of 
the world’s oil, it does increase America’s vulnerability.  In the event of a disruption of 
oil from a major provider, the United States is left with fewer options to maintain its oil 
supply and the economy. 
As China’s growing demand for oil becomes an issue for the global economy 
there are some decisions that must be made to address it.  One option is to dramatically 
reduce the demand for oil in the United States.  Ideally, developing replacement energy 
sources, new technologies and a new institutional outlook on oil would reduce demand.  
Although not an overnight solution, it is absolutely vital that the United States lessen its 
demand for oil imports so as to reduce the America’s strategic vulnerability to oil import 
disruption. 
Reducing demand would require a significant restructuring of the way Americans 
view oil.  Wider availability of public transportation could encourage less long-distant 
commuters from starting their cars.  Increasingly stringent fuel economy standards would 
have to be imposed upon automobile manufacturers.240  New technologies for using 
alternative fuel sources in both industry and homes would have to be developed.  
Although this does not directly address the issue of China’s demand for oil, it would 
allow for more flexibility in dealing with China and other oil consumers and decrease the 
significance of oil producers in U.S. foreign policy interests. 
3. New Containment Policy?  
Although it may be tempting for some to call for a strong containment strategy 
toward China, it is not realistic in today’s world.  In contrast to the Cold War period, the 
United States depends on Chinese manufacturing (and China needs the United States for 
markets).  Additionally, a major portion of the overseas national debt is held in China.  
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Both nations are interested in maintaining strong economies and therefore will not likely 
jeopardize them for political gain.  Therefore, from the U.S. perspective it would be 
nearly impossible to heavily sanction China and thus create a containment strategy.  The 
domestic forces that restrict the United States from acting too strongly against China have 
a potentially very different effect in China.  As discussed earlier, the risk of popular 
dissent population could force Beijing to take action to protect overseas interests, even if 
it caused a loss of U.S. markets. 
4. Monitor Indicators 
First, it is imperative for the United States to continue to closely monitor China’s 
involvement in Venezuela and establish some clear lines that China should not cross.  If 
at some point the proposed lines are crossed a dramatic shift will be required in United 
States policy toward Venezuela and Latin America as a whole.  China’s presence in 
Venezuela is growing.  Since intentions are almost impossible to discern before history is 
written, it is necessary for the United States to establish and monitor some benchmarks 
that will be an indication that things are not advancing in accordance with U.S. foreign 
policy and national interest. 
Second, it is essential that analysts and policy makers carefully consider each new 
indication that a threat to the United States is emerging without explaining away the 
facts.  Many authors have rationalized the evidence to make China a non-threat, only to 
have the facts turn against them.  Rather than hunting for new evidence to discredit the 
“China Threat” theories, it would be more beneficial to explore the possibility that there 
is a developing situation that will require a nuanced foreign policy to address it.241  The 
following section is one such policy option that may work to mitigate the potential threat 
by revamping the framework in which China is rising.  Without a dramatic shift in the 
present realist framework, the risk of violent competition will remain great. 
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C. A MULTILATERAL OPTION 
China is likely to stand out as a major competitor in the struggle to secure stable 
oil sources.  Clearly, the growing demand in China is of vital interest to both Japan and 
the United States.  After a decade of frustration with China since the end of the Cold 
War, Japan has adopted a more realist approach than the previous hope of economic 
interdependence.242  At the same time, Japan has concerns regarding future U.S. policy 
toward China.  There has been a growing fear in Japan since 1972 that Washington would 
abandon Japan and side with China on policy issues.243  This fear could be a stumbling 
block for Washington when developing a trilateral agreement on oil distribution.  Even if 
Japan were to take a leading role in energy negotiations with China, there is still a 
significant potential for a wedge to develop between the United States and Japan.  Due to 
the competitive nature of Washington and Tokyo in their respective relations with China, 
it is unlikely that Congress would agree to any concessions if raised by Japan and 
China.244  Therefore, a multilateral framework of a much larger scale is required to move 
forward in any energy deals among the three largest oil importers. 
History has often demonstrated the risks associated with the rise of new world 
powers.  As the balance of power shifts, the status quo is invariably forced to change.  
Avoiding major conflict is often dependent on the willingness of the established powers 
to make adequate concessions to the emerging powers.245  It is this circumstance that the 
United States and Japan are faced with in dealing with China.  Some possible scenarios 
for future war with China are based on the competition for resources and a purely realist 
approach to foreign policy.246  While no one can accurately predict what future conflicts 
will entail, it is likely that without some international framework to deal with oil 
distribution and sharing, there is an increased potential for conflict to erupt. 
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A multilateral approach to foreign policy has been a core value in Japan since 
joining the United Nations in 1956.247  Japan has been a part of many international 
organizations and has demonstrated significant leadership in all.  Japan leads the world 
by example with regard to its adherence and support of international treaties such as the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  Most important to Washington is that Japanese goals 
in international organizations have been predominantly favorable toward U.S. 
interests.248  Therefore, in developing a multilateral solution to the problem of oil 
markets and distribution, it would be beneficial for Washington to be supportive of 
Japan’s leadership in creating a new framework. 
As demonstrated, China is heavily reliant on oil imports to fuel its rapidly 
expanding economy.  The source of Beijing’s sense of insecurity is twofold.  First, China 
lacks a military that is capable of projecting power to protect overseas investments and 
oil supply.  Second, China has traditionally shunned the alliances that could have helped 
create a security sphere to protect its investments and overseas energy sources.  The 
military aspect is beginning to change as the PLA is expanding its role to cover more than 
just the Taiwan issue and is investing in expeditionary capability.249  
To mitigate China’s insecurity and at the same time protect the national interests 
of both the United States and Japan, a multilateral international institution for shared 
energy security is necessary.  A combined effort by the major oil consumers and 
producers, to meet the challenges of growing energy demand, would create a stable 
environment for all to thrive.  Fair pricing, distribution, and interconnectivity can all exist 
in a shared security forum.  Technology sharing to improve efficiency should be another 
aspect of the agreement.  This will lessen the potential for future armed-conflict over 
resources and help mitigate the possibility of inadequate supply to meet the growing 
demand. 
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The creation of a new worldwide institution will require a large number of 
countries to come on board without coercion.  It will need a country that has others’ 
respect, a strong stake in the issue, and is generally trusted as a positive influence in the 
world.  The best country to fit all of these is Japan.  Japan is very highly regarded by 
most countries and viewed as having the most positive influence in the world.250  
Conversely, the United States has become a less popular actor on the world stage.  
Although undoubtedly the most powerful in both economic and military terms, the 
United States is viewed negatively by many countries and may not be trusted to 
successfully lead the way in establishing a new international agreement.251   Therefore, 
the United States needs Japan to take a leadership role in this effort for it to be successful.  
Placing Japan at the forefront of negotiations, with the backing of the United States, it is 
more likely that a majority of nations would agree to a proposed framework.  Although 
China generally views Japan with suspicion, it has often demonstrated an interest in 
participating in global trade organizations such as the WTO.252  China has also 
demonstrated willingness to work diplomatically in a multilateral setting as in the six-
party talks.  After a majority of China’s trading partners have signed on to an energy 
security agreement, it is even more likely that China would be willing to work within the 
new framework, rather than compete against it.  It could be that Japan is the key to 
“China’s peaceful rise.”253 
Now is the time to come to an agreement on global cooperation over energy 
resources.  Creating a framework and institutions that promote cooperation before supply 
becomes limited is very important for success.  It will take time for a new framework to 
become institutionalized in the international arena and create a system that is trusted to be 
fair for all, discouraging independent action.  If the United States, Japan and China all  
 
                                                 
250 “Global Poll Finds Iran Viewed Negatively,” World Public Opinion.org, (February 3, 2006) 
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/home_page/168.php?nid=&id=&pnt=168&lb=hmpg1 
(accessed September 10, 2007). 
251 Ibid. 
252 Lardy, Integrating China, 1. 
253 Bijian, “China's ‘Peaceful Rise’,” 2005. 
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work together now, the likelihood of future war over oil among the great powers will be 
diminished.  In addition, the shock of an oil shortage on any one country will be 
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